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1  Introduction 
 
An increase in economic globalisation and international trade in the past two 
decades1 has amounted to an increase in the number of multinational enterprises2 
that have debt, own assets and conduct business in various jurisdictions around the 
world. 3 Coupled with the recent worldwide economic recession this has inevitably 
caused the increased occurrence of multinational financial default, also known as 
cross-border insolvency (CBI).4 CBI deals with the situation where insolvency 
proceedings are initiated in one jurisdiction with regard to a debtor's estate and the 
debtor also has property, debt or both in at least one other jurisdiction.5  
 
When a multinational enterprise is in financial distress, the structure of such an 
enterprise poses significant challenges to the question of how to address its 
insolvency. This is due to the fact that, although the multinational enterprise is found 
in different jurisdictions around the world, the laws addressing its insolvency are 
local. The prospect of restructuring the multinational enterprise or liquidating it in 
order to satisfy creditor claims depends largely upon the ease with which the 
insolvency law regimes of multiple jurisdictions can facilitate a fair and timely 
                                            
  Jeanette Weideman. LLB (NWU), LLM (NWU). Candidate Attorney: Adams & Adams. Email: 
weidemanjeanette@gmail.com. This is a reworked article based on the LLM study of J 
Weidemann entitled European and American Perspectives on the Choice of Law regarding 
Cross-border Insolvencies of Multinational Corporations  (Faculty of Law, North-West University 
(Potchefstroom Campus), May 2011) 
  Leonie Stander. Bjuris, LLB, LLM, LLD. Professor, Faculty of Law, North-West University, 
(Potchefstroom Campus). Email: leonie.stander@nwu.ac.za. 
1  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 547-576.  
2  For a discussion of what constitutes a multinational enterprise, see Mevorach Insolvency within 
Multinational Enterprise Groups 9-31.  
3  Meskin, Kunst and King Insolvency Law 17-1; Stander 2002 Journal for Juridical Science 72-87.  
4  Westbrook 2002 Am Bankr L J 1-41.   
5  Meskin, Kunst and King Insolvency Law 17-1; Stander 2002 Journal for Juridical Science 73.  
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resolution to the financial distress of that multinational enterprise.6 In instances 
where there is a lack of statutory provisions dealing with the CBI of a debtor, states 
turn to their own domestic law to regulate the CBI proceedings.7 The 
liquidator/trustee of the debtor in a local jurisdiction (known as the foreign 
representative in other jurisdictions) will have to follow up property and interests 
situated in foreign jurisdictions in order to attempt to attach them for the benefit of the 
local creditors. Usually the foreign representative will have to bring an application in 
a foreign jurisdiction to be recognised as such. The foreign representative will have 
to abide by the legal principles of the foreign jurisdiction where the assets and 
interest are located, as the foreign law will be applicable to all assets located within 
that jurisdiction.8 An additional difficulty to CBI matters is the fact that some 
jurisdictions adopt a universalist approach to CBI matters, whilst other jurisdictions 
adopt a territorialist approach to said matters. The differing approaches lead to 
conflict in the determination of the proper forum where CBI proceedings should be 
instituted9 and prevent the harmonisation of international insolvency law.  
 
The legal response to this problem has produced two important international 
instruments that were designed to address key issues associated with CBI. Firstly, 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (the Model Law) in 1997,10 
which has been adopted by nineteen countries11 including the United States of 
America12 and South Africa.13 Secondly, the European Union (EU)14 adopted the 
                                            
6  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 548.  
7  Stroebel Protocols as a Possible Solution 2.  
8  Alternatively, the foreign representative might attempt to open another (concurrent) bankruptcy 
proceeding in the relevant foreign jurisdiction. Should the foreign representative succeed, there 
will be a multiplicity of insolvency proceedings in the relevant foreign jurisdiction. See Olivier and 
Boraine 2005 CILSA 373-395.  
9  Stroebel Protocols as a Possible Solution 2. 
10  Hereafter referred to as the Model Law.  
11  See UNCITRAL 1997 www.uncitral.org for a list of all of the countries that have adopted the 
Model Law. The Model Law provides a set of procedural recommendations that the adopting 
states should incorporate into their national bankruptcy laws. It does not provide substantive laws 
requiring the adopting states to materially alter their rules with regard to insolvency proceedings. 
See Silkenat and Schmerler Law of International Insolvencies 489; Beckering 2008 Law & Bus 
Rev Am 300. 
12  Hereafter referred to as the US.  
13  The Model Law was adopted by South Africa by the enactment of the Cross-Border Insolvency 
Act 42 of 2000.  
14  Hereafter referred to as the EU.  
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European Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (EC Regulation) in 2000.15 
These two instruments address the management of general default by a debtor16 
and are aimed at providing a legal framework which seeks to enhance legal 
certainty, cooperation, coordination and harmonisation between states in CBI 
matters throughout the world. The US adopted the Model Law in 2005 by enacting 
Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (hereafter referred to as Chapter 
15).17 
 
Both the EC Regulation and Chapter 15 adopt a "modified universalist" approach18 
towards CBI matters. Furthermore, both of these instruments distinguish between 
"foreign main proceedings", which are insolvency proceedings in the jurisdiction 
where the debtor has its centre of main interest (COMI), and "foreign non-main 
proceedings",19 which are insolvency proceedings in the jurisdiction where the debtor 
has an "establishment".20 Prima facie it seems that the US and the EU adopt 
different approaches when determining the COMI of a debtor. Against this 
background, this article will address:  
 the question of whether or not there are any real differences in the determination 
of the "COMI concept" by the EU and the US;   
 the various requirements and approaches in determining the COMI of a debtor 
under the EC Regulation and Chapter 15;   
                                            
15  The Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings (EC 
Regulation).  
16  Westbrook 2002 Am Bankr L J 4.    
17  Additionally, the American Law Institute has drafted the Principles of Cooperation in 
Transnational Insolvency Cases Among the Members of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (2003) (the ALI principles) that also provide guidelines in CBI matters.  
18  A central question that arises in CBI matters is whether the jurisdiction of the insolvency court 
should be confined to local assets or should cover all of the debtor's assets to be found 
worldwide (Goode et al Transnational Commercial Law 544). The four main diverging 
approaches supported by academics are traditional territorialism, cooperative territorialism, 
traditional universalism and modified universalism. For an in-depth discussion of these different 
approaches, see Botha and Stander 2011 Journal for Juridical Science 19-31; Stroebel Protocols 
as Possible Solutions 5; Westbrook 2005 Am Bankr L J 713-728; LoPucki 1999-2000 Mich L Rev 
2216-2251; Westbrook 2006 Tex Int'l L J 321-337; LoPucki 2005 Am Bankr L J 79-103; Howell 
2008 Int'l Law 113-151; Adams and Fincke 2008-2009 Colum J Eur L 43-87; Westbrook 1999-
2000 Mich L Rev 2276-2328; Bufford 2005 Am Bankr L J 105-142; and Mevorach Insolvency 
within Multinational Enterprise Groups 65-85.  
19  Under the EC Regulation non-main proceedings are named "secondary proceedings". See 
Recital 12 of the EC Regulation. 
20  See a 3(1)-3(2) of the EC Regulation and s 1517(b) of Chapter 15 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code (Chapter 15). 
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 the EU and US approaches to the presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of 
incorporation; and  
 the problems concerning business enterprise groups that are not addressed by 
the EC Regulation or Chapter 15.   
 
An analysis and comparison of the legal principles relating to the COMI concept, the 
"establishment" concept and the related aspects that are mentioned above, will set 
out the guiding principles indicating the practical approaches that should be adopted 
in South Africa in connection with CBI matters.  
 
South Africa has also adopted the Model Law approach by ratifying the Model Law 
and enacting national legislation, namely the Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 
2000. Although this Act came into operation on 28 November 2003 it is not yet 
effective in South Africa as the Minister of Justice has not yet designated any states 
in respect of which the Act will apply in terms of section 2(2)(a) of the Act.  
 
Europe and the United States of America are currently the world leaders in the area 
of CBI and the CBI legislation adopted and applied in these jurisdictions seems to be 
effective. As South Africa's Cross-Border Insolvency Act is not yet effective, there is 
no local policy guidance available to insolvency practitioners with regard to the 
application of the Model Law. An analysis of the European and American 
approaches to CBI matters will therefore provide South African practitioners with 
valuable insight, knowledge and lessons that will be used to understand and apply 
the principles adopted and applied in terms of the EC Regulation and Chapter 15, 
specifically the COMI concept, the "establishment" concept in the case of integrated 
multinational enterprises and related aspects.    
 
2  Foreign main proceedings: COMI21 
 
                                            
21  This paragraph concerns mainly the following case law, which are in the possession of the 
authors: Eurofood IFCS Ltd - Bondi v Bank of America NA (Case C-341/04, OJ [2006] C 143/11); 
SAS ISA Daisytek Court of Appeals Versailles, 4 Sep 2003, JOR 2003/288; Re BRAC Rent-A-
Car International Inc. [2003] 2 All ER 201; In the Matter of Daisytek-ISA Limited English High 
Court (Leeds Registry), 16 May 2003 BCC 562.  
J WEIDEMAN AND AL STANDER                                            PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
137 / 638 
 
It is of significant importance to have a proper understanding of the meaning of 
COMI and "establishment" in order to ensure that foreign proceedings are 
recognised correctly as foreign main proceedings, foreign non-main proceedings or 
neither. The question as to what happens in a jurisdiction where there is no COMI or 
"establishment" should also be examined. 
 
2.1  Interpretation and application of COMI under the EC Regulation 
 
The purpose of this section is to analyse closely the legal definition of COMI, the 
time for determining COMI, the legal system applicable to main insolvency 
proceedings and the substantive law provisions covered by such proceedings. As 
this article focuses on corporate entities, there will be a closer look at the 
presumption contained in the EC Regulation with regard to companies and legal 
persons. In addition this chapter will illustrate some practical problems concerning 
the determination of the COMI of a debtor company that have been encountered 
since the EC Regulation came into existence and how courts have dealt with these 
problems.  
 
2.1.1 Introduction  
 
It should be noted that the EC Regulation provides rules concerning the intra-
community consequences arising from insolvency proceedings only, and applies 
only to disputes arising within the EU.22 Additionally, the EC Regulation will apply to 
insolvency proceedings only where the COMI of the debtor is located within the EU23 
and such insolvency proceedings were opened on or after 31 May 2002.24    
 
Article 3(1) of the EC Regulation states that the court of the Member State within the 
territory where a debtor's COMI is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency 
                                            
22  Wessels International Insolvency Law 235.  
23  Recital 14 of the EC Regulation. The only exception is that Denmark is neither bound by the EC 
Regulation nor subject to its application. See Recital 33 of the EC Regulation. Therefore where 
the COMI of the debtor is located outside the EU, the EC Regulation will not apply (see the 
discussion in par 2.1.7 below). In such an instance the private international law branch of the 
relevant Member State will govern the question as to whether insolvency proceedings may be 
opened against the debtor, the rules that will apply to such proceedings and the legal 
consequences of such proceedings. See Wessels International Insolvency Law 235. 
24  The EC Regulation entered into force on 31 May 2002. See a 47 of the EC Regulation.  
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proceedings.25 Such insolvency proceedings are main insolvency proceedings,26 
which have universal scope27 and, therefore, encompass all of the debtor's assets to 
be found worldwide.28 The EC Regulation guarantees this universality by creating a 
system of mandatory and automatic (ex lege) recognition of the main insolvency 
proceedings in all of the Member States.29 Main insolvency proceedings may be 
winding-up or reorganisational proceedings.30 The determination of a debtor's COMI 
will always be a question of fact.31 COMI is an autonomous concept in the sense that 
the term is unique to the EC Regulation. It should be applied uniformly throughout 
the EU and should be interpreted independently from the national laws of the various 
Member States.32 Furthermore, COMI is described as a concept that is flexible and 
                                            
25  The connecting factor that is thus used to determine if a court will have jurisdiction is the debtor's 
COMI (Torremans "Coming to Term with the COMI Concept"). In SAS ISA Daisytek Court of 
Appeals Versailles, 4 Sep 2003, JOR 2003/288 (hereafter referred to as the Daisytek-case) it 
was held that the only test, as far as jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings is 
concerned, is the location of the COMI of the debtor-company.  
26  The proceedings are "main" because if local (secondary) proceedings are opened, these local 
proceedings will be subject to the mandatory rules of coordination and subordination of the 
"main" proceedings. See para 14 of the Virgós and Schmit Report 269, hereafter referred to as 
the Virgós-Schmit Report. 
27  The proceedings will be "universal" because all of the assets of the debtor will be encompassed 
in such proceedings, regardless of where they may be located, unless local (secondary) 
proceedings are opened in a state where the debtor has an establishment. See para 14 of the 
Virgós-Schmit Report 269. Some of the most important legal consequences of such universal 
application of the main insolvency proceedings include the following: (i) all assets located outside 
the Member State opening the main insolvency proceedings are also included in such 
proceedings; (ii) the proceedings encompass all of the creditors of the debtor; (iii) the effects of 
the main insolvency proceedings are automatically recognised in all other Member States; (iv) 
the liquidator appointed in the main insolvency proceedings has the automatic authority to act in 
all other Member States; and (v) the individual execution against assets of the debtor found in 
any Member State is not possible. See para 19 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 269-270. 
28  Recital 12 of the EC Regulation. The EC Regulation can, however, guarantee universal scope 
only within the EU as such. Its scope outside the EU depends on whether the foreign state in 
question allows for this or not. The laws of the foreign state outside the EU should therefore be 
consulted in order to see if the EU proceedings effectively extend to the assets located outside 
the EU. See Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 54.  
29  The automatic recognition entails that in any of the Member States the same effects are 
produced as under the law of the Member State opening the main insolvency proceedings. The 
recognition is immediate in the sense that it takes place by virtue of the EC Regulation (ex lege 
Regulatorae) without it being necessary to resort to preliminary proceedings or other formalities 
(such as publication). See Wessels Current Topics 21.   
30  Such winding-up and reorganisational proceedings are listed in Annexure A of the EC 
Regulation. See para 16 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 269. By contrast, secondary proceedings 
may be winding-up proceedings only. See para 29 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 271. 
31  Wessels International Insolvency Law 300. As Chapter 15 does not state that non-main 
(secondary) proceedings may be winding-up proceedings only, it is presumed that non-main 
proceedings under Chapter 15 may be winding-up or reorganisational proceedings.  
32  Para 31 Eurofood IFCS Ltd - Bondi v Bank of America NA (Case C-341/04, OJ [2006] C 143/11) 
hereafter referred to as the Eurofood-case. Also see Interedil Srl (In Liquidation) v Fallimento 
Interedil Srl (C-396/09) [2012] Bus LR 1583 and Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency 
Regulation 37. 
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has an open character, because it can be applied to any class of debtors or any 
organisational structure of a debtor.33  
2.1.2  Definition of COMI34 
 
The legal definition of COMI is contained in Recital 13 of the EC Regulation which 
states that:   
 
The centre of main interest should correspond to the place where the debtor 
conducts the administration of his interest on a regular basis and is therefore 
ascertainable to third parties. 
 
Virgós and Garcimartín35 submit that this legal definition of COMI contained in 
Recital 13 is a combination of three fundamental ideas which cumulatively create the 
test of application in determining the COMI of a debtor: 
 
(i)  The primacy of the "administrative connection" 
 
According to the legal definition, the administration of the debtor's interests is of 
primary relevance in the determination of international jurisdiction. In this context 
"administration" must be understood as referring to the management and control of 
the debtor's interests whilst "interests" refers to the debtor's economic affairs.36 A 
very interesting and insightful fact is that the "administrative connection" (which is the 
place of management and control of the debtor) takes precedence over both the 
"operational connection" (which is the place of the debtor's business or operation) 
and the "asset connection" (which is the place where the assets of the debtor are 
located). With regard to subsidiary companies, the "administrative connection" will be 
                                            
33  The EC Regulation does not make any distinctions based on the capacity or the nature of the 
debtor (eg public or private; trader or non-trader) or the way in which an organisation is 
structured (eg a company, partnership, association). See Virgós and Garcimartín European 
Insolvency Regulation 38.  
34  The EC Regulation does not give a definition of "centre of main interest" provided for in a 3(1). 
Wessels submits that courts base their interpretation of the COMI concept mainly on two 
elements, namely the 33 recitals of the EC Regulation which form part of the preamble of the EC 
Regulation and the Virgós-Schmit Report. See Wessels Current Topics 150-160. Like the EC 
Regulation, Chapter 15 also has no definition of COMI.  
35  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 40.  
36  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 40. "Interest" encompasses not only 
commercial, industrial and professional activities, but also includes general economic activities in 
order to include the activities of private individuals such as consumers. See para 75 of the 
Virgós-Schmit Report 281.  
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the place where the head office (the main centre of administration) of each separate 
subsidiary company is located.37 According to Virgós and Garcimartín38 the fact that 
decisions of subsidiary companies are taken in accordance with instructions received 
from the parent company or shareholders living elsewhere39 does not influence the 
determination of the COMI of the subsidiary companies.40 
 
(ii) The primacy of the "external sphere"41 
 
As insolvency is a foreseeable risk it is important that international jurisdiction42 
should be based on a place which is known to the debtor's potential creditors. This 
enables creditors to calculate the legal risks which have to be assumed in the case 
of the insolvency of the debtor.43 The debtor's COMI must, therefore, be 
"ascertainable by third parties", which entails that it must be visible44 to creditors and 
potential creditors.45  
 
The debtor cannot claim that its COMI is situated in a place other than the place 
which third parties have been led to believe is the place where the debtor's decisions 
are taken and the management of its affairs takes place.46 In the matter of 
                                            
37  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 40-41.  
38  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 41.  
39  The subsidiary accordingly makes a decision based on instructions from its parent, but the 
decision is made by the subsidiary at its place of administration. 
40  In the Eurofood-case it was held that the mere fact that a parent company can or may control the 
economic choices of its subsidiary which is located in another Member State will be insufficient to 
rebut the presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of incorporation contained in a 3(1) of the EC 
Regulation. See para 37 of the Eurofood-case. 
41  When determining the COMI of a debtor, the external organisation (which refers to the way the 
debtor manifests itself on a regular basis to the outside world) plays an important role. The term 
"on a regular basis" indicates a quality of presence. It also refers to a degree of permanence, but 
no minimum time period is implicitly imposed by the EC Regulation. 
42  The Member State which opens the main insolvency proceedings has "international jurisdiction" 
in the insolvency proceedings, as the national insolvency laws of that Member State govern the 
insolvency proceedings. See para 75 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 281. Also see para 2.1.4 
below.  
43  Para 75 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 281. 
44  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 42. 
45  Wessels International Insolvency Law 298. In Ci4Net.Com Inc and DBP Holdings Ltd High Court 
of Justice Chancery Division Leeds, ZIP 2004, 1796, EWiR 2004, 20 May 2004 847 it was held 
that the most important third parties referred to in Recital 13 of the EC Regulation are the 
potential creditors. Also see Parkside Flexibles SA High Court Leeds Registry, 9 Feb 2005; 
BenQ Mobile Holdings BV 1503 IE 4371/06, Local Court of Munich, 5 Feb 2007 discussed in 
para 3.3 below.  
46  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 41. That could be so particularly in the 
case of a so-called "letterbox" company not carrying out any business in the territory of the 
Member State where the registered office is located. See para 35 of the Eurofood-case.  
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Ci4Net.Com and DBP Holdings47 it was held by the High Court of Justice Chancery 
Division Leeds that a business must have a COMI which has some element of 
permanence. The company's COMI cannot shift as its principal director moves from 
one country to another. In this case, the company presented itself to its most 
substantial creditor as having its principal executive offices in London and, therefore, 
it was found that the debtor-company had its COMI in the United Kingdom (UK).48  
 
Similarly, in Shierson v Vleiland-Boddy49 the Court of Appeal of England declared: 50 
 
It is important, therefore, to have regard not only to what the debtor is doing but also 
to what he would be perceived to be doing by an objective observer. And it is 
important, also, to have regard to the need, if the centre of main interests is to be 
ascertainable by third parties, for an element of permanence. The court should be 
slow to accept that an established centre of main interests has been changed by 
activities which may turn out to be temporary or transitory. 
 
In Eurofood IFCS Ltd-Bondi v Bank of America NA51 it was held that the COMI of a 
debtor must be identified by reference to criteria that are both objective and 
ascertainable by third parties. These criteria are necessary in order to ensure legal 
certainty and foreseeability concerning the determination of the court with jurisdiction 
to open main insolvency proceedings.52 The "objective ascertainability" of the 
debtor's COMI is of importance as it enables creditors to determine the commercial 
or financial risks they might face if the debtor they deal with becomes insolvent.53  
 
In the matter of Re Stanford International Bank Ltd (In Receivership)54 one of the 
questions before the court was what the meaning of the phrase "ascertainable" was. 
In response to this question, Justice Lewison held that: 55 
                                            
47  Ci4Net.Com Inc and DBP Holdings Ltd High Court of Justice Chancery Division Leeds, ZIP 2004, 
1796, EWiR 2004, 20 May 2004. 
48  See also Wessels International Insolvency Law 297. 
49  Shierson v Vleiland-Boddy Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 27 Jul 2005 [2005] EWCA Civ 974  
(hereafter referred to as the Shierson-case). 
50  Para 55(3) Shierson-case.  
51  Para 35 Eurofood-case.  
52  Para 33 Eurofood-case. Legal certainty and foreseeability are all the more important in that, in 
accordance with a 4(1) of the EC Regulation, the determination of the court with jurisdiction 
entails the determination of the law which is to apply. 
53  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 42. 
54  Re Stanford International Bank Ltd (In Receivership) [2009] BPIR 1157.  
55  Para [62] Re Stanford International Bank Ltd (In Receivership) [2009] BPIR 1157. For a 
discussion on this matter, see Wessels 2011 Insolvency Intelligence 17-23.   
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[w]hat was ascertainable by a third party was what was in the public domain, and 
what a typical third party would learn as a result of dealing with the company. 
 
(iii) The principle of unity 
 
A debtor can (and must) have one COMI only at any given time as only one set of 
main insolvency proceedings may be opened under the EC Regulation.56 The word 
"main" in the term "main interests" serves as a criterion for the case where the 
interests of the debtor include activities of different types that are run from different 
centres that the debtor may have.57 If a debtor has more than one place of 
management, the place of "central administration" must be determined by 
establishing which one of the places of management is the "directing centre" where 
the head office functions are carried out.58 It should further be reiterated that once 
main proceedings have been opened in a Member State, only secondary (territorial) 
proceedings may be opened in other Member States.59 
 
2.1.3  The reference date for determining COMI 
 
Article 3(1) of the EC Regulation states that the courts of the Member State within 
which the COMI of the debtor is situated shall have the jurisdiction to open main 
insolvency proceedings. The question arises as to exactly when the COMI should be 
located in a Member State for its courts to have international jurisdiction over the 
insolvency proceedings. There seem to be two viewpoints concerning this question. 
Firstly, in Genevan Trading Co Ltd v Kjell Tore Skjevesland60 it was held that the 
COMI of a debtor should be located in a Member State at the moment the court 
decides to open (or not to open) insolvency proceedings. The second view is 
expressed by Virgós and Garcimartín, who submit that the relevant time that the 
                                            
56  Para 73 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 281. The EC Regulation adopts a model that is based on a 
single main insolvency proceeding which can be supplemented by one or more territorial (non-
main) proceedings.  
57  Wessels Current Topics 161. 
58  In order to determine the COMI of the debtor, one would look at various factors, such as the 
place where strategic decision-making takes place, where the relationships with shareholders 
are, where the general supervision of the business takes place, and where the central treasury 
management takes place. See Botha and Stander 2011 Journal for Juridical Science 31 ff for an 
in-depth discussion of this subject. 
59  This refers to the procedural rule of lis pendens. See aa 16(1) and 16(2) of the EC Regulation.  
60  See Genevan Trading Co Ltd v Kjell Tore Skjevesland High Court, 11 Nov 2002 [2003] BCC 391. 
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COMI of a debtor must be located in a specific jurisdiction in order to determine 
international jurisdiction is the moment the application to open insolvency 
proceedings is filed.61 This approach is in accordance with the principle of 
perpetuatio fori, which entails that the transfer of a debtor to a different state after an 
application for the opening of insolvency proceedings has been filed does not alter 
the jurisdiction of the court.62 In support of their view,  Virgós and Garcimartín refer to 
the Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber-case,63 in which the European Court of Justice64 
held that the court of the Member State within the territory of which the debtor's 
COMI is situated when the debtor lodges the request to open insolvency 
proceedings retains the jurisdiction to open such insolvency proceedings even if the 
debtor moves its COMI to the territory of another Member State after lodging the 
request but before the proceedings are opened.65 It is submitted that the approach 
suggested by Virgós and Garcimartín should be adopted, as this approach was 
affirmed by the ECJ66 and is accordingly binding on all Member States.67 
Additionally, this approach will prevent forum shopping by a debtor and will give rise 
to legal certainty across the EU.68  
 
A debtor's COMI is not fixed69 in the sense that it can change. Companies can, 
therefore, consciously decide to change their COMI for valid business reasons or as 
part of insolvency planning.70 For example, in the Dentist Changing House-case71 
the debtor moved its COMI from Germany to the UK before it filed for insolvency 
proceedings.72 The court ruled that the debtor's COMI was in the UK, regardless of 
                                            
61  Para 55 Shierson-case. Also see Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 49-50.  
62  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 50.  
63  Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber ECJ, 17 Jan 2006, C-1/04, JOR 2006/59. Hereafter referred to as 
the Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber-case. 
64  Hereafter referred to as the ECJ.  
65  Wessels International Insolvency Law 326.  
66  In the Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber-case.  
67  Marshall (ed) European Cross Border Insolvency 2-56 (para 2.016).  
68  Also see Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 47- 48. 
69  In the Shierson-case it was held that it would be inconsistent with the language of a 3(1) of the 
EC Regulation to hold that the COMI of a debtor was fixed by some past event. See para 41.   
70  Smits and O'Hearn "Multinational Insolvency Forum Shopping" 487; Goode et al Transnational 
Commercial Law 495. In the Shierson-case it was held that there is no principle of immutability 
and a debtor must be free to choose where he carries on those activities which fall within the 
concept of "administration of his interests". See para 55(4). 
71  Dentist Changing House AG Celle, 18 Apr 2005 (29 IN 11/05). 
72  Also see the matter of Trillium (Nelson) Properties Ltd v Office Metro Ltd [2012] ILPr 30. In this 
matter the debtor company, which was registered in England, had changed its COMI and 
transferred its main headquarters and place of administration from England to Luxembourg. The 
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the fact that all of the claims against it had been incurred in Germany, because the 
COMI of a debtor at the time of filing determines the international jurisdiction for the 
purposes of article 3 of the EC Regulation. It is, accordingly, a necessary incident of 
the debtor's freedom to choose where it carries on those activities which fall within 
the concept of "administration of its interests", and the debtor may choose to change 
its COMI for a self-serving purpose. In particular the debtor may even choose to do 
so at a time when insolvency threatens.73 From the wording of the EC Regulation it 
would seem that in instances where the debtor transfers its COMI from one state to 
another before an application to open insolvency proceedings is brought before a 
court, the court may (depending on the circumstances of the case) possibly uphold 
the jurisdiction of the state where the debtor's new COMI is located.74 In this regard it 
was held in the Shierson-case that:75 
 
[i]n circumstances where there are grounds for suspicion that a debtor has sought, 
deliberately, to change his centre of main interests at a time when he is insolvent, or 
threatened with insolvency, in order to alter the insolvency rules which will apply to 
him in respect of existing debts, the court will need to scrutinize the facts which are 
said to give rise to a change in the centre of main interests with that in mind. The 
court will need to be satisfied that the change in the place where the activities which 
fall within the concept of "administration of his interests" are carried on which is said 
to have occurred is a change based on substance and not an illusion; and that that 
change has the necessary element of permanence. 
 
It is additionally submitted that, should a debtor change the location of its COMI, it 
must comply with the requirements set out in the Eurofood-decision of being 
identifiable objectively and being ascertainable by third parties.76  
 
An example of where a debtor could change the location of its COMI would be where 
it begins as a small company in state A, where it is registered. A few years later, 
when the company has expanded, it starts to take part in business activities in state 
                                                                                                                                       
debtor company changed its COMI three years prior to its liquidation. The court subsequently 
opened main insolvency proceedings in Luxembourg.  
73  Para 55(5) Shierson-case.  
74  Although this might increase the opportunity for debtors to "forum shop", there are certain 
elements that reduce this kind of conduct. Firstly, a new location should be the place where the 
debtor "conducts" the administration of his main interests on a "regular basis", which means that 
there needs to be stability in the new location; secondly it is usually relatively costly to change 
the location of a company; thirdly, the general rules of fraud may be invoked to prevent forum 
shopping. See Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 50-51.  
75  Para 55(5) Shierson-case. 
76  See para 2.2.6 below for the approach adopted by the US courts in instances where a "tax 
haven" is involved.  
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B. As time goes by most of the company's business activities with its clients are 
conducted in state B, it shifts its administrative section and operational decision-
making to state B, all of its assets are located in state B and all of its employees 
work in state B. From the facts it can be seen that the COMI of the company might 
have shifted after a certain time. When the company first started, it was operational 
only in state A, where it was registered, and its COMI would probably have been 
located there. If one evaluates the situation a few years later, however, when nearly 
all of its ties are to state B (except that it is registered in state A), it is highly probable 
that its COMI would now have shifted to state B.  
 
2.1.4  Law applicable to the main insolvency proceedings 
 
The law of the Member State within the territory of which the main insolvency 
proceedings are opened (known as the lex (forum) concursus)77 will generally78 be 
the law applicable to the insolvency proceedings79 and will, therefore, govern the 
opening, conduct and closure of the insolvency proceedings.80 Insolvency matters 
that are always governed by the lex concursus include set-offs, the proving of debts, 
the powers conferred upon a liquidator, the distribution of assets and the avoidance 
of antecedent debts.81 The lex concursus is applicable to the main insolvency 
proceedings as well as the secondary insolvency proceedings and it determines both 
the procedural and substantive effects82 of the insolvency proceedings.83 The lex 
concursus of one Member State is, therefore, "exported" to another Member State. 
The opening of main insolvency proceedings under article 3(1) of the EC Regulation 
                                            
77  Wessels International Insolvency Law 245.  
78  There are some exceptions. For example the lex concursus will not apply to secondary 
proceedings concerning a creditor's rights in rem, rights under a contract of employment, certain 
set-off rights and the reservation of title clauses. See aa 5-15 of the EC Regulation which sets 
out specific rules for certain matters. Also see Smits and O'Hearn "Multinational Insolvency 
Forum Shopping" 487; Goode et al Transnational Commercial Law 572-573.   
79  Article 4(1) of the EC Regulation.  
80  Article 4(2) of the EC Regulation. See a 4(2)(a)-(m), which lists the proceedings governed by the 
lex concursus in particular.  
81  Smits and O'Hearn "Multinational Insolvency Forum Shopping" 487. When the COMI of a debtor 
is located within the EU, the EC Regulation provides choice-of-law rules for cooperation amongst 
the relevant courts as well as jurisdictional rules. 
82  An example of a procedural aspect of insolvency proceedings is the time that is provided for 
giving notice to creditors of the pending insolvency proceedings or a meeting of creditors. An 
example of a substantive aspect of insolvency proceedings is the distribution priority for creditors' 
claims. See also para 2.1.5 below. 
83  Wessels International Insolvency Law 250.  
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will be limited by the opening of secondary (territorial) proceedings in terms of article 
3(2). In order to protect the interest of local creditors, the national law of the Member 
State opening the secondary proceedings will apply to all assets located in that 
Member State. The main proceedings may influence the conduct of such secondary 
proceedings due to coordination and sub-coordination rules which derive from the 
EC Regulation and to which the secondary proceedings are subject.84 
 
If a debtor has its COMI in state A and has assets and creditors in state B, the 
insolvency law of state A will determine the realisation procedure of the assets and 
distribution priority of the creditors located in state A and state B. If the debtor should 
have an "establishment" in state B where secondary insolvency proceedings are 
instituted, the insolvency law of state B would determine the realisation procedure of 
the assets located there and the distribution priorities of the local creditors. 
 
2.1.5  Substantive law falling within the scope of article 3(1) of the EC Regulation 
 
The EC Regulation applies to any debtor, irrespective of the characteristics of that 
debtor, the nature of the debtor's activities or the nature of the debtor's debts.85 
Although article 3(1) of the EC Regulation confers international jurisdiction upon the 
courts located in the debtor's COMI in relation to insolvency proceedings, the extent 
of such jurisdiction is not defined in the EC Regulation.  
 
Virgós and Garcimartín86 identify three categories of proceedings that fall within the 
jurisdiction of the court that opens the main insolvency proceedings, namely:   
a)  the opening, conduct and closure of insolvency proceedings as well as all 
questions forming part of the core insolvency procedure itself;87 
                                            
84  Wessels Current Topics 22. 
85  Wessels International Insolvency Law 237. The debtor may be a natural person or a legal entity 
and may relate to debts which are of public, commercial or private nature.  
86  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 60.  
87  Examples of such proceedings include matters concerning (a) the appointment of a liquidator; (b) 
the divestment of the debtor; (c) the administration of the insolvent estate; (d) modification or 
termination of stay proceedings; (e) the determination of the ranking of claims; (f) the collection 
and liquidation of assets; and (g) the distribution of the proceeds of the assets to the creditors. 
See Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 60.  
J WEIDEMAN AND AL STANDER                                            PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
147 / 638 
 
b)  actions which, although not forming part of the insolvency procedures itself, 
are directly derived from the insolvency proceedings and are closely linked 
with such proceedings;88 and  
c) preservation measures which are ancillary to either of the two previous 
categories.89 
 
The EC Regulation will, however, not be applicable to insolvency proceedings that 
concern insurance undertakings, credit institutions, investment undertakings which 
provide services involving the holding of funds or securities of third parties, or to 
collective investment undertakings.90  
 
2.1.6  Presumption with regard to companies and legal persons 
 
In order to enhance legal certainty91 article 3(1) of the EC Regulation states that the 
place of registration92 of a company or legal person93 shall be presumed to be its 
                                            
88  There are two requirements that must be fulfilled before the court opening the insolvency 
proceedings will have the jurisdiction with regard to such actions. Firstly, the outcome of the 
proceedings must depend on insolvency law (the legal foundation of the action must, 
substantively speaking, be insolvency law) and secondly, from a procedural point of view the 
action must be closely connected with the insolvency proceedings. Examples of such 
proceedings include: (a) disputes between the liquidator and the debtor related to whether an 
asset belongs to the estate of the debtor or not; (b) disputes regarding the exercise of power by 
the liquidator and (c) proceedings to determine, avoid or recover preferences, fraudulent 
conveyances or any other acts which are to the detriment of the general body of creditors. See 
Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 60-61.  
89  There are three conditions that need to be satisfied. Firstly, the provisional order or preservation 
measures should be aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of the insolvency proceedings; 
secondly, the debtor must have its COMI in a Member State; and thirdly, the insolvency 
proceedings must be included in the Annexes of the EC Regulation. See Virgós and Garcimartín 
European Insolvency Regulation 66. Examples of preservation measures include: (a) 
interlocutory measures to do something or refrain from doing something; (b) the appointment of a 
temporary administrator; and (c) an order for the attachment of assets. See para 78 of the 
Virgós-Schmit Report 282.  
90  Article 1(2) of the EC Regulation.  
91  Torremans "Coming to Term with the COMI Concept" 175. 
92  Whilst the English version of the EC Regulation refers to "registered office", the linguistic version 
of the EC Regulation refers to "statutory seat". The term "statutory seat" is known in the company 
laws of all of the EU Member States except the UK and Ireland, who use the term "registered 
office". These terms should, however, be construed as interchangeable with regard to CBI 
matters. The "registered office" or "statutory seat" refers to the place which is designated as the 
official address of the entity by the founders or the members of a company or legal person. The 
registered office will be located at the place pointed out as such in the instrument of formation of 
the entity, its statutes, or in a separate document. See Virgós and Garcimartín European 
Insolvency Regulation 45.  
93  In this context "company or legal person" should be understood in a wide sense and encompass 
legal persons (whether corporations, foundations or associations) as well as unincorporated 
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COMI in the absence of proof to the contrary. The main advantage of the 
presumption under article 3(1) is that it allows for the quick and straightforward 
determination of a single court that possesses the jurisdiction to deal with the whole 
insolvency of the debtor-company.94 
 
This presumption is rebuttable95 and the burden of proof will rest upon any party 
wishing to displace the presumption.96 There will be sufficient proof to the contrary if 
it is established that the administration of the debtor-company's main interests are 
conducted on a regular basis from a Member State other than the Member State 
where the registered seat of the debtor-company is situated.97 If other connections 
are claimed and proven, but there is still no reasonably clear result in favour of the 
location of a debtor's COMI in a state other than the state where its registered office 
is found, the presumption will prevail.98 
 
An example of a matter where the presumption was rebutted is the case of Enron 
Directo Sociedad Limitada.99 The debtor-company was incorporated in Spain. One of 
its creditors filed for the opening of administration proceedings as main insolvency 
proceedings in the UK. The court accepted evidence that all the main executive, 
administrative and strategic decisions concerning the financial and other activities of 
the debtor-company were conducted in London. Accordingly the High Court of 
                                                                                                                                       
associations and partnerships which are subject to insolvency proceedings (although they have 
no separate legal personality). See Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 44.  
94  Torremans "Coming to Term with the COMI Concept" 176-178.  
95  Wessels Current Topics 155. The fact that the presumption is rebuttable means that in certain 
cases, for example where the "debtor has nothing more than a letterbox in the place where it is 
registered, the formal criterion can be set aside in favour of a flexible determination of the 
debtor's COMI on the basis of the facts of the specific case". See Torremans "Coming to Term 
with the COMI Concept" 177.  
96  Wessels International Insolvency Law 313.  
97  Torremans "Coming to Term with the COMI Concept" 175; Wessels International Insolvency Law 
313. In the matter of Rastelli Davide e C Snc v Hidoux (C-191/10) [2012] All ER (EC0 239 (ECJ 
(1st Chamber)) (hereafter referred to as "the Rastelli-case"), the ECJ held that the fact that the 
property of the two companies was intermixed was not sufficient to show that the COMI of the 
second company was also located in the Member State where the first company had its COMI. In 
order to reverse the presumption under Regulation 3(1) of the EC Regulation, it is required that 
an overall assessment of all the relevant factors (in a manner that is ascertainable by third 
parties) indicates that the actual centre of management of supervision of the second company is 
situated in the Member State where the initial main insolvency proceedings were opened, before 
a court may find that the COMI of the second company is also located in the Member State of the 
first company. See paras 32 and 39 of the judgement.  
98  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 44. Torremans "Coming to Term with 
the COMI Concept" 177 submits that the presumption provides "the right balance between legal 
certainty on the one hand and flexibility on the other hand".  
99  Enron Directo Sociedad Limitada High Court of London, 4 Jun 2002 (unreported). 
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London held that, although the registered office of the debtor was in Spain, its COMI 
was located in London, where main insolvency proceedings could be opened, as its 
head office was located in England.100 
 
2.1.7  Position with regard to debtor-companies incorporated outside the EU 
 
An interesting situation occurs in instances where a debtor-company has its COMI 
within the EU but is registered outside the EU. The question that arises is whether or 
not the EC Regulation is applicable in such instances. This situation was addressed 
in Re BRAC Rent-A-Car International Inc,101 where the English High Court was 
confronted with the question of whether or not the EC Regulation applies only to 
legal persons that are incorporated within the European Union. In this case the 
debtor-company was incorporated in Delaware and had its registered office in the 
US, but its operations were almost entirely conducted in the UK.102 The company 
petitioned for an administration order before the English High Court. Fearing that 
they would be negatively affected by the administration of the company in the UK, 
two of the judgment creditors objected to the proceedings and contested that the 
English court did not possess the jurisdiction to make an administration order. They 
argued that the legal measures of the EC should not be presumed to apply to entities 
incorporated outside the EU. They further maintained that the EC Regulation dealt 
with the position between different Member States and should not be read as having 
extra-territorial effect outside the Community.103 After consideration of the various 
applicable sections of the EC Regulation, including article 3 and Recital 13, the court 
rejected the submissions of the judgment creditors. The court held that the courts of 
a Member State would have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings in respect of 
a company that is incorporated outside the Community if the company's COMI is 
situated within that Member State, which was the case in this instance. In 
determining if the EC Regulation is applicable in respect of a debtor-company, the 
                                            
100  See also Wessels Current Topics 165; AvCraft International Ltd ZIP 2005, 1611; EWiR 2005, 
791 District Court Weillheim, 22 Jun 2005; Re Finnish LLC Court of Appeal Svea, No Ö4105-03, 
30 May 2003 (unreported); 3T Telecom Ltd [2005] EWHC 275 (Ch) for examples of cases where 
the presumption of a 3(1) was rebutted.  
101  Re BRAC Rent-A-Car International Inc [2003] 2 All ER 201. 
102  The company traded from an address in England, all of its employment and trading activity 
contracts were governed by the English law, and it was registered as an overseas company in 
terms of the UK's Companies Act of 2006. See para 4-5.   
103  Par 20 Re BRAC Rent-A-Car International Inc [2003] 2 All ER 201. 
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only test is whether or not that debtor's COMI is to be found within the relevant 
Member State, irrespective of where it is incorporated.104 The court further held 
that:105  
 
Turning to purposive interpretation, it seems to me that a reading of the regulation 
which limited it (as regards legal persons) to debtors who are incorporated in any of 
the member states would prevent the regulation from achieving some of the 
purposes which are described in the recitals and would leave it open to avoidance, 
providing an incentive for artificial operations … It would allow those who use 
corporate bodies to arrange that, although their business, assets and operations are 
based in a member state, the relevant corporate body is incorporated outside the 
Community, so that the provisions of the regulation would not apply to it or its 
assets. That would be inconsistent with the aim described in recital (3), and such an 
incentive for manipulation would be at least as inconsistent with the objectives of 
the regulation as the examples of forum-shopping among Member States 
mentioned in recital (4). 
 
2.1.8  The problem regarding multinational groups of companies 
 
One important problem that has not been addressed by the EC Regulation106 is that 
it does not contain any provision concerning groups of affiliated companies (parent-
subsidiary schemes).107 If insolvency proceedings are instituted against a company 
which is related to another company in some or other way, the former company is 
considered to be a separate debtor in accordance with the rule that every legal 
person is a single debtor under the application of the EC Regulation.108 Each debtor-
company must be considered separately and the concept of COMI, therefore, refers 
to the COMI of each separate debtor, not to the COMI of the group.109  
 
                                            
104  Paras 24 and 31. Re BRAC Rent-A-Car International Inc [2003] 2 All ER 201. 
105  Para 27 Re BRAC Rent-A-Car International Inc [2003] 2 All ER 201. The same line of reasoning 
was followed in Norse Irish Ferries and Cenargo Navigation Limited High Court of Justice, 20 
Feb 2003 (unreported) as well as Salvage Association High Court of Justice, 9 May 2003, [2003] 
EWHC 1028 (Ch). 
106  Torremans "Coming to Term with the COMI Concept" 177.  
107  Para 76 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 282. Torremans submits that a 3(1), as it currently stands, 
needs to be applied separately to each of the affiliated companies as far as each of them has a 
separate legal entity. See Torremans "Coming to Term with the COMI Concept" 177 and Re 
BRAC Rent-A-Car International Inc [2003] 2 All ER 201 para 27.  
108  Wessels International Insolvency Law 330. Also see Rastelli Davide e C Snc v Hidoux (C-
191/10) [2012] All ER (EC0 239 (ECJ (1st Chamber); para 30 of the Eurofood-case.  
109  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 46. In order to open or consolidate 
insolvency proceedings against any of the related companies as a principal or jointly liable 
debtor, jurisdiction must exist in terms of the EC Regulation for each of the individually 
concerned debtors with a separate legal entity. See para 76 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 282. 
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Torremans110 submits that the EC Regulation "therefore fails to provide an adequate 
solution for the instances where it would be desirable to let a single court deal with 
the whole set of insolvency cases concerning closely related affiliated companies". 
From case law it seems that courts have, in certain circumstances, been able to find 
a common COMI for a whole affiliate group in order for the whole group of debtor-
companies to be jointly administered under one main proceeding. For example, the 
case of In the Matter of Daisytek-ISA Limited111 concerned an English holding 
company which had three German subsidiary companies and one French subsidiary 
company. The holding company applied to the English High Court for an 
administration order, which included its German and French subsidiaries. The 
English Court found that the COMI of each of these subsidiaries was also located in 
England. The court took various surrounding circumstances into consideration when 
coming to this decision. One of the decisive factors was that the majority of the 
administration of the German and French subsidiaries took place in England. 
Furthermore, the court stated that, in determining the main interest of a debtor, a 
court has to consider the scale of the interest administered in a specific jurisdiction 
as well as the importance of the interest administered in that jurisdiction. Then the 
court should consider the importance and scale of the debtor's interests administered 
in any other jurisdiction that might qualify as the COMI of the debtor. Recital 13 of 
the EC Regulation requires that the COMI of a debtor "be ascertainable by third 
parties". The most important third parties referred to are creditors and potential 
creditors. In the given set of facts, the financiers and trade suppliers were the most 
important creditors of the subsidiary companies. Financing of the subsidiaries was 
organised in England and seventy per cent of the goods that were supplied to the 
subsidiaries took place by way of contracts concluded in England. Accordingly, the 
functions performed in England were of an important scale and of a significant 
nature. Additionally, the functions performed locally in Germany and France were 
quite limited. Therefore, the court held that the presumption in favour of the 
                                            
110  Torremans "Coming to Term with the COMI Concept" 177-178.  
111  In the Matter of Daisytek-ISA Limited English High Court (Leeds Registry), 16 May 2003 BCC 
562. For an in-depth discussion of this case, see Botha and Stander 2011 Journal for Juridical 
Science 34 ff. 
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jurisdiction of incorporation112 had been rebutted and the COMI of the three German 
and the one French subsidiaries were located in England.113  
 
One of the legal questions before the ECJ in the Eurofood-case was what the 
determining factor is for identifying the COMI of a subsidiary company where it and 
its parent have their respective registered offices in different Member States.114 
Eurofood IFCS Ltd (Eurofood) was a company which was a wholly owned subsidiary 
of Parmalat SpA (Parmalat).115 Eurofood had its registered office in Ireland, whilst 
Parmalat was incorporated in Italy. Parmalat controlled the policy of Eurofood as it 
was in a position to do so by virtue of its shareholding and power to appoint 
directors. Eurofood, however, conducted the administration of its interests on a 
regular basis (in a manner ascertainable by third parties) in Ireland and in complete 
and regular respect for its own corporate identity. In considering where the COMI of 
Eurofood was situated, the ECJ held that:116  
 
[w]here a company carries on its business in the territory of the Member State 
where its registered office is situated, the mere fact that its economic choices are or 
can be controlled by a parent company in another Member State is not enough to 
rebut the presumption laid down by the Regulation. 
 
Relying heavily upon the provisions of article 3(1) of the EC Regulation,117 the ECJ 
held that the debtor's COMI was located in Ireland, where it was incorporated.118 
 
According to Mevorach119 the degree of integration and centralisation of 
management may differ from one multinational enterprise to another. It may occur 
                                            
112  Contained in a 3(1) of the EC Regulation.  
113  See paras 3, 13, 14, 16 and 17 of the Daisytek-case. Similarly, in Cirio del Monte NV Civil Court 
of Rome, Bankruptcy Section, 13 Aug 2003, the Italian Court held that all of two Italian 
companies and their Dutch subsidiary had their COMI in Rome. In this case the respective 
insolvency proceedings of each debtor-company were placed under the supervision of the same 
court and the same liquidator was appointed for the group of companies. See Smits and O'Hearn 
"Multinational Insolvency Forum Shopping" 498. 
114  Whereby the COMI of that subsidiary is situated in the Member State where its registered office 
is situated. See para 26 Eurofood-case.  
115  Parmalat SpA was therefore the parent company and Eurofood was its subsidiary. For an in-
depth discussion of this case, see Botha and Stander 2011 Journal for Juridical Science 37 ff. 
116  Para 37 Eurofood-case.  
117  Article 3(1) of the EC Regulation states that, in the case of a company or legal person, its place 
of registration will be presumed to be its COMI, in the absence of proof to the contrary. Also see 
para 2.1.6 above.  
118  See para 2.3.1 below for Westbrook's criticism of the Eurofood-case.  
119  Mevorach Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups 34.  
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that the degree of integration and centralisation of management of a multinational 
enterprise 
 
[does] not necessarily correlate with the legal structure opted for by the enterprise 
(i.e. the corporate group form), which provides for full separation among group 
companies. As a result, the application of concepts of separateness between 
entities and limited liability to the group case may collide with the actual way the 
group operates, and therefore may achieve different outcomes compared with the 
single company case. The problem becomes clearer when considering the ability of 
the enterprise to exploit the group structure to the detriment of certain stakeholders 
of the group, as well as the benefits the group may be deprived of if strict 
adherence to the legal separateness of its elements is always adopted. 
 
Mevorach120 believes that, in general, the insolvency proceedings of integrated (or 
inter-related) corporate entities121 should be centralised. She describes the following 
advantages of this approach:   
 
(a) The jurisdiction in which the insolvency proceedings are instituted will likely 
meet the creditors' expectations and correspond with their legitimate 
interests;122  
(b) it will prevent forum shopping;123 and 
(c) it will enable creditors to be involved in the insolvency proceedings and 
provide for appropriate creditor representation.124  
 
However, it seems that the European courts may in certain instances be reluctant to 
hold that the insolvency proceedings of integrated entities should be centralised. For 
                                            
120  See Ronen-Mevorach 2006 JBL 468-486; Mevorach 2008 ICLQ 427-448; and Mevorach 2011 
JBL 666-681. 
121  Integrated (or inter-related) multinational enterprises are those enterprises that operate on a 
worldwide basis and (i) are centrally controlled; (ii) are managed jointly as a group and 
coordinated single business; or (iii) where various components of the enterprise are inter-linked 
resulting in a "significant financial and administrative interdependence" between the various 
entities or subsidiaries of the multinational enterprise. See Mevorach 2008 ICLQ 431-432. 
122  The expectations and views of the all of the creditors of the inter-related entity, as a whole, 
should be taken into account when determining the jurisdiction in which the insolvency 
proceedings should be instituted. See Ronen-Mevorach 2006 JBL 473.  
123  See Ronen-Mevorach 2006 JBL 473-474. 
124  However, there are certain disadvantages to centralising the insolvency proceedings of a 
multinational enterprise. Eg, certain creditors that are situated a great distance from the 
jurisdiction dealing with the insolvency of the inter-related multinational enterprise may not have 
the financial means to travel that distance and to be involved in those proceedings, there might 
be certain language barriers, and decisions may be made that will benefit the creditors as a 
whole but disadvantage certain individual creditors. See Ronen-Mevorach 2006 JBL 474-476.  
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example, in the Rastelli-case125 the French Commercial Court found that the COMI 
of the debtor company ("the French company") was situated in France and, 
accordingly, opened main insolvency proceedings in France. The liquidator of the 
French company applied to the French Commercial Court for an order that a second 
company, which had its registered office in Italy ("the Italian company") be joined in 
the insolvency proceedings opened against the French company for the reason that 
the property of the two companies was intermixed. Taking the presumption under 
article 3(1) of the EC Regulation into consideration,126 the French court refused to 
join the Italian company to the main insolvency proceedings in France, because the 
Italian company's registered office was in Italy and it did not have an establishment 
in France. The ECJ was asked to provide a preliminary opinion on whether or not the 
courts of a Member State which had opened main insolvency proceedings against a 
company could, under the national laws of that Member State, join to those 
insolvency proceedings a second company (which had its registered office in another 
Member State) based solely on the fact that the property of the two companies was 
intermixed. The ECJ held that the courts of a Member State which had opened main 
insolvency proceedings against a company could, under the national laws of that 
Member State, join to those insolvency proceedings a second company (which had 
its registered office in another Member State) only if it is shown that the COMI of the 
second company was also located in that Member State.127  
 
2.1.9  Conflicts of jurisdiction 
 
As already stated, a debtor may have only one COMI at any given time as there may 
be only one set of main insolvency proceedings opened in the EU. As COMI is an 
autonomous concept, it should be applied uniformly throughout the EU and should 
be interpreted independently from the national laws of the various Member States.128 
There are, however, two types of jurisdictional conflicts that occur in practice. 
 
                                            
125  Rastelli Davide e C Snc v Hidoux (C-191/10) [2012] All ER (EC0 239 (ECJ (1st Chamber). 
126  See the discussion in para 2.1.6 above.  
127  See paras 22-29 of the Rastelli-case.  
128  See para 2.1.1 above.  
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a) Positive conflict 
 
Firstly, a Member State may determine that a debtor's COMI is located within its 
jurisdiction, whilst another Member State may also find that the debtor's COMI is 
located within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, two different Member States may be 
equally convinced that a debtor's COMI is located in their respective territories.129 
This is known as a positive conflict.130 Obviously this creates a problem as a debtor 
may have only one COMI at any given time. Article 16(1) of the EC Regulation 
provides the solution to this problem by stating that:  
 
[a]ny judgment opening insolvency proceedings handed down by a court of a 
Member State which has jurisdiction … shall be recognised in all the other Member 
States from the time that it becomes effective in the State of the opening of 
proceedings.  
 
In accordance with the first-in-time rule131 (also known as the principle of temporal 
priority)132 Recital 22 of the EC Regulation states that the decision of the first court to 
open proceedings should be recognised in other Member States and those other 
Member States do not have the power to scrutinize the first court's decision.133 The 
court that opened insolvency proceedings first will, therefore, be the court 
possessing the appropriate jurisdiction.134 If an interested party (who has the view 
that the debtor's COMI is situated in a Member State other than that the one in which 
the main insolvency proceedings were opened) wishes to challenge the jurisdiction 
assumed by the court which first opened the main insolvency proceedings, it may 
use the remedies prescribed by the national law of that Member State.135  
 
An example of a matter where this problem came into consideration was the 
Daisytek-case.136 Daisytek was a company incorporated under the laws of France.137 
                                            
129  Wessels International Insolvency Law 327. 
130  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 51.  
131  Wessels International Insolvency Law 327.  
132  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 51. 
133  In the Eurofood-case it was held that Recital 22 of the EC Regulation makes it clear that "the 
principle of mutual trust requires that the courts of the other Member States recognise the 
decision opening main insolvency proceedings, without being able to review the assessment 
made by the first court as to its jurisdiction." See para 42.  
134  Wessels International Insolvency Law 327.  
135  Para 43 of the Eurofood-case.  
136  See also para 2.1.8. 
J WEIDEMAN AND AL STANDER                                            PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
156 / 638 
 
After having found that the COMI of Daisytek was located in the UK, the High Court 
of Leeds subsequently opened insolvency proceedings against Daisytek on 16 May 
2003. On 26 May 2003, following a filing of a petition for insolvency, the Commercial 
Court of Pontoise in France put Daisytek under administration. The administrators 
appointed by the High Court of Leeds applied to have the judgment of the 
Commercial Court of Pontoise set aside, because they considered that the 
insolvency proceedings opened in the UK prevented the opening of other main 
insolvency proceedings in France. The Commercial Court of Pontoise, however, 
dismissed the application of the administrators, whereupon they appealed to the 
Court of Appeal in Versailles. The Court of Appeal held that the only test, as far as 
jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings is concerned, is the COMI of the 
company. Furthermore, the court stated that the English judge correctly found that 
the presumption of article 3(1) of the EC Regulation had been rebutted and that, as 
far as the French company was concerned, the Bradford office in England was the 
COMI of Daisytek. As stated above, article 16 of the EC Regulation states that any 
judgment opening insolvency proceedings handed down by a court of a Member 
State which has jurisdiction pursuant to article 3 must be recognised in all the other 
Member States. As the High Court of Leeds had jurisdiction over Daisytek, the 
administration order of 16 May 2003 should have been recognised in France and 
prevented any French Court from opening subsequent main insolvency proceedings. 
Accordingly, it was held that the Commercial Court of Pontoise had no jurisdiction to 
put the debtor-company under administration on 26 May 2003. The Court of Appeal 
subsequently overturned both the judgement to open main insolvency proceedings in 
France and the judgement dismissing the administrators' application given by the 
Commercial Court of Pontoise.138 
 
b)  Negative conflict 
 
Secondly, it can occur that the court located in the jurisdiction of the registered office 
of the debtor rejects the request to open insolvency proceeding on the ground of lack 
of international jurisdiction, because the court considers the debtor's COMI to be 
                                                                                                                                       
137  Daisytek was a subsidiary company of an English holding company. The holding company also 
had three German subsidiaries.  
138  For an in-depth discussion of this case, see Botha and Stander 2011 Journal for Juridical 
Science 34 ff. 
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located in another (second) state. The court of the second state before which the 
matter is then brought also denies that the COMI is situated within its jurisdiction. 
This is known as a negative conflict.139  In such an instance, the court of the second 
state cannot reject its own jurisdiction by claiming that the court of the first state was 
competent to seize the matter.140 The court of the second Member State has to 
accept, and take into account, the decision of the first Member State when 
determining if it has jurisdiction to seize the matter. The courts of a Member State 
should, based on the principle of mutual trust, recognise judgments delivered by the 
courts of other Member States.141 
 
2.2   Interpretation and application of COMI under Chapter 15142   
 
2.2.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code143 aims to harmonise foreign and domestic 
bankruptcy proceedings of multinational corporations and to minimize the expenses 
                                            
139  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 51; 53.  
140  Virgós and Garcimartín refer to a matter in which a Swedish debtor had emigrated to and was 
habitually resident in Spain. (The matter was decided by the Svea Court in October 2002; see 
Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 53.)  The Swedish court found that the 
debtor had no COMI in Sweden. Accordingly, if a request for insolvency proceedings were to be 
made in Spain, the Spanish court would have to accept that the debtor does not have a COMI in 
Sweden. Any doubt as to whether the debtor's COMI is situated in Sweden or Spain would be 
resolved in favour of the latter jurisdiction. 
141  Recital 22 of the EC Regulation. Grounds for non-recognition should, however, be reduced to a 
minimum. See the case of SAS Rover France Commercial Court Nanterre, 19 May 2005. 
Additionally, the EC Regulation does not recognise the principle of forum non convenience and a 
court may therefore not refuse to accept the jurisdiction accorded to it under the EC Regulation 
on the ground that, in the court's opinion, it would be more appropriate for the case to be dealt 
with on proceedings opened in another Member State. See Wessels International Insolvency 
Law 303.   
142  This paragraph concerns mainly the following case law, which are in the possession of the 
authors: In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Ltd 374 BR 
122 (Bankr SDNY 2007); In re Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products NV 301 BR 651 (Bankr D 
Del 2003); In re Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products NV 308 BR 672 (D Del 2004); In re Owens 
Corning 419 F3d 195 (3rd Cir 2005); In re SPhinX 351 BR 103 2006 371 BR 10 (SDNY); In re 
Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd 349 BR 627, 47 Bankr Ct Dec 31; Lernout & Hauspie Speech 
Products NV v Stonington Partners Inc 268 BR 395 (D Del 2001); In re Betcorp Ltd 400 BR 266. 
143  Chapter 15 replaces s 304 of the US Bankruptcy Code, which governed foreign ancillary 
proceedings. See Silkenat and Schmerler Law of International Insolvencies 491; Westbrook 2005 
Am Bankr L J 717. As Chapter 15 came into operation only about five years ago, there is 
currently not an abundance of case law dealing with its interpretation. 
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of such proceedings.144 It applies when there is a foreign insolvency proceeding 
relating to a debtor that is subject to any kind of bankruptcy matter in the US.145  
 
2.2.2 The ALI principles146 
 
The Principles of the American Law Institute (ALI Principles) were drafted with 
Chapter 15 in mind.147 These Principles provide authority for the resolution of a 
number of issues that are not fully addressed in Chapter 15. Although the ALI 
Principles were developed for use specifically amongst the NAFTA countries (the 
US, Mexico and Canada),148 the ALI concluded that they should be applied generally 
to multinational insolvency matters in the US courts.149 It should be noted that the 
ALI Principles are merely "unofficial best-practice recommendations" and are, 
accordingly, not legally binding.150 
 
2.2.3 The relevance of the EC Regulation in ascertaining the meaning of COMI 
under the Model Law 
 
Section 1508 of Chapter 15 states that: 
 
[i]n interpreting this chapter, the court shall consider its international origin, and the 
need to promote an application of this chapter that is consistent with the application 
of similar statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions. 
 
                                            
144  Beckering 2008 Law & Bus Rev Am 281-312; Mason "United States" 197.    
145  Chapter 15 will therefore apply to the insolvency of any multinational corporation that is a US 
corporation or a foreign corporation with operations or assets in the US. See Westbrook 2005 
Am Bankr L J 715.  
146  The ALI is arguably the most prestigious and influential of all American law-reform organisations. 
See Westbrook 2001-2002 Conn J Int'l L 99-106.  
147  Westbrook 2002 Am Bankr L J 33. 
148  Thus, at a regional level.  
149  The ALI Principles were developed by the Transnational Insolvency Project, due to the need for a 
private-sector initiative to CBI matters. Their aim was to develop cooperative procedures to be 
used in business insolvency cases that involve companies with assets or creditors in more than 
one of the three NAFTA countries. The integration and cooperation by the NAFTA countries in 
CBI matters is essential to fully realise the free flow of investments among these countries. This 
entailed that lawyers and judges had to become familiar with the insolvency laws of all the 
NAFTA countries in order to function effectively in CBI matters where the NAFTA countries were 
involved. The ALI Principles provided the solution by providing a set of principles, procedures 
and practices to narrow the range of uncertainty in insolvency proceedings in the NAFTA 
countries. See Westbrook 2002 Am Bankr L J 3-33; Westbrook 2005 Am Bankr L J 715. 
150  Westbrook 2002 Am Bankr L J 33. For a further discussion on the ALI Principles, see Westbrook 
2001-2002 Conn J Int'l L 99-106.  
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The EC Regulation is relevant for the purpose of understanding Chapter 15, because 
it inspired the Model Law. Although the Model Law came into force prior to the EC 
Regulation, the EC Regulation was completed first151 and the EC Regulation 
accordingly served as a source of some key concepts that were adopted in the 
Model Law, including the COMI concept.152 As the Model Law was heavily influenced 
by the EC Regulation, the EC Regulation itself as well as case law on the meaning of 
COMI under the EC Regulation will serve as the most persuasive authority when 
determining the COMI concept under Chapter 15.153 One significant example is the 
definition of COMI provided by the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 
(the Legislative Guide),154 which states that the COMI of the debtor "is the place 
where the debtor conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis and 
that is therefore ascertainable by third parties".155 This definition is identical to the 
definition of COMI provided in Recital 13 of the EC Regulation.  
 
2.2.4 Recognition of foreign proceedings under Chapter 15 
 
A case under Chapter 15 commences by the filing of a petition for the recognition of 
a foreign proceeding.156 Section 1517(a) states that there are three requirements 
that need to be complied with before an order recognising a foreign proceeding will 
be entered. Firstly, the foreign proceedings must qualify either as foreign main or 
non-main proceedings within the meaning of section 1502.157 A foreign main 
                                            
151  The Model Law was adopted by UNCITRAL in 1997, whilst the EC Regulation came into force 
only in 2000. However, the concept of COMI originated from the 1995 EU Convention on 
Insolvency Proceedings, which was reproduced as the EC Regulation. See Westbrook 2002 Am 
Bankr L J 2. 
152  Westbrook 2002 Am Bankr L J 2; Hammer and McClintock 2008 Law & Bus Rev Am 257-280.  
153  Another source of authority that a US court is obliged to treat as persuasive is the Guide to 
Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, UN Gen Ass UNCITRAL 
30th sess, UN Doc A/CN.9/442 (1997) which was promulgated in connection with the approval of 
the Model Law. The Guide explains that the use of the concept "where the debtor has the centre 
of its main interests" as the determinant that a foreign proceeding is a "main" proceeding was 
modelled on the use of that concept in the EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedings (1995), 
which was already in the process of being adopted when UNCITRAL drafted the Model Law. See 
In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd 349 BR 627, 47 Bankr Ct Dec 31 634[3], hereafter referred to 
as the Tri-Continental Exchange-case. Also see Westbrook 2002 Am Bankr L J 2.   
154  UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part Three: Treatment of Enterprise Groups in 
Insolvency (2010) (the Legislative Guide). 
155  Paras 4; 41 of the Legislative Guide. 
156  Sections 1504 and 1509(a) of Chapter 15.  
157  Sections 1517(b)(1) and s 1502(4). Although the phrases "principal place of business", "chief 
executive office" and "real seat" are more familiar to American judges and lawyers, Chapter 15 
was drafted to follow the Model Law as closely as possible. According to Westbrook the drafters 
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proceeding refers to a foreign proceeding that is pending in the country where the 
debtor has its COMI. No definition is provided for the meaning of COMI under 
Chapter 15.158 A foreign non-main proceeding refers to a foreign proceeding where 
the debtor has an "establishment" in the foreign country where the proceeding is 
pending.159 An "establishment" refers to any place of operations where the debtor 
carries out a non-transitory economic activity.160 Secondly, the foreign representative 
applying for recognition must be a person or body. Thirdly, the petition for recognition 
and accompanying documents must comply with the requirements set out in section 
1515. This section concerns the application for recognition of foreign proceedings by 
a foreign representative, which is done by way of a petition for recognition.161  
 
Should a court grant recognition of the foreign proceedings, the foreign 
representative has direct access to the US courts to petition for appropriate relief. 
                                                                                                                                       
of Chapter 15 believed that the COMI jurisdictional test should be uniform around the world. See 
Westbrook 2005 Am Bankr L J 719; Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1019-1040. If the 
foreign proceedings are pending in a country where the debtor has neither its COMI nor an 
"establishment", then such foreign proceedings will not meet the definitional requirements of s 
1502 and cannot be recognised under Ch 15. See Glosband 2007 American Bankruptcy Institute 
Journal 2.  
158  See Recital 13 of the EC Regulation. For a discussion, see para 2.1.2 above.  
159  Section 1517(b)(2) of Chapter 15. Chapter 15 provides different relief for foreign main and 
foreign non-main proceedings. S 1519 deals with the effects of recognition of foreign main 
proceedings. Upon recognition of foreign main proceedings, the assets of the debtor-company 
will be subject to an automatic stay under s 362 of the US Bankruptcy Code. This means that the 
foreign representative will have the authority to operate the debtor's assets, which includes the 
power to lease, use or sell the assets of the debtor under s 363 and s 552 of the US Bankruptcy 
Code. The foreign representative may additionally commence a plenary case in terms of s 301 or 
302 of the Code. Foreign non-main proceedings, on the other hand, are not subject to automatic 
relief, but s 1521(a)(6) of Chapter 15 states that a court may grant similar relief in foreign non-
main proceedings at the request of the foreign representative. See Morton 2005-2006 Fordham 
Int'l L J 1312-1363.  
160  Section 1502(2) of Chapter 15. See para 3 below for a discussion on non-main proceedings and 
the meaning of an "establishment".  
161  The petition must be accompanied by the following documentation: (i) a certified copy of the 
decision commencing such proceedings and appointing the foreign representative; (ii) a 
certificate from the foreign court affirming the existence of such foreign proceedings and 
appointment of the foreign representative; (iii) any evidence acceptable to the court of the 
existence of such foreign proceedings and of the appointment of the foreign representative in the 
absence of evidence stated in (i) and (ii); and (iv) a statement identifying all foreign proceedings 
with respect to the debtor that are known to the foreign representative. It is said that Chapter 15 
provides a simple, objective standard for the recognition of foreign proceedings. Under s 304 of 
the US Bankruptcy Code, which has now been repealed and replaced by Chapter 15, there were 
subjective requirements. See Glosband 2007 American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 2. He 
submits that there is no flexibility when it comes to the recognition of foreign proceedings. There 
is, however, flexibility in granting, modifying or denying relief under Chapter 15 or communicating 
and coordinating amongst multiple proceedings. See ss 1501(a), 1511, 1512, 1519, 1521, 1522 
and 1523 of Chapter 15; Glosband 2007 American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 2. 
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The foreign representative has the capacity to sue or be sued in a US court and the 
courts will grant comity and cooperation to that foreign representative.162 
 
2.2.5 The reference date for determining COMI  
 
In Lavie v Ran (in re Ran)163 the debtor (Ran) had emigrated from Israel to the US 
eight years before the application for recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings 
against him was brought before the US courts by an Israeli foreign representative 
(Lavie). The foreign representative applied for recognition of the foreign proceedings 
in Israel either as main or non-main proceedings. After taking various objective 
factors into account,164 the court found that the debtor's COMI was situated in the US 
and that the foreign proceedings could accordingly not be recognised as foreign 
main proceedings. The foreign representative subsequently raised the argument that 
the court should look at the operational history of the debtor and, since his COMI had 
been situated in Israel some years before, the court should find that his COMI is 
situated in Israel. The United States Court of Appeals, however, disagreed with the 
argument of the foreign representative and furnished three reasons for its decision. 
Firstly, section 1502165 of Chapter 15 is written in the present tense, which leads to 
the conclusion that the COMI determination has to be present. Accordingly, the time 
when a debtor's COMI should be present in a specific jurisdiction is at the time when 
the petition for recognition is filed. Secondly, if courts were to assess the COMI of a 
debtor by focussing on its operational history, the possibility of conflicting COMI 
determinations by different courts would increase166 and would accordingly defeat 
the purpose of Chapter 15 (and the Model Law) of harmonising CBI matters 
worldwide. In the third place, the COMI of the debtor should be ascertainable by third 
parties. If third parties know that the main interests of a debtor are in a certain 
                                            
162  Section 1509(b) of Chapter 15.  
163  Lavie v Ran (In re Ran) 607 F3d 1017 (5th Cir 2010).  
164  Some factors that the court took into consideration were that the debtor, together with his family, 
had emigrated from Israel to the US more than eight years earlier, the debtor had no intention to 
return to Israel, the debtor was employed and resident in the US, the debtor was a permanent 
legal resident of the US and the debtor maintained his finances exclusively in the US. See Lavie 
v Ran (In re Ran) 607 F3d 1017 (5th Cir 2010) para [8] . 
165  Section 1502 sets out the definitions of Chapter 15. S 1502(4) and states that a foreign main 
proceeding "means a foreign proceeding pending in the country where the debtor has the centre 
of its main interest".  
166  Some courts may, for example, attach more importance to activities that took place in their 
jurisdictions in the past or may attach different weight to certain evidence which could lead to 
conflicting COMI determinations.  
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country, the fact that its main interests were located in another country some years 
earlier should be irrelevant. It is submitted that the reasoning of the court on this 
point was correct and its approach will undoubtedly lead to legal certainty and 
increased harmonisation of international insolvency law around the world. It should 
be noted that, although this matter concerns an individual person, it is presumed that 
the general principle laid down by the court will apply to debtor companies and other 
juristic persons too.167 
 
2.2.6 Presumption under Chapter 15 
 
As is the instance under the EC Regulation,168 article 1516(c) of Chapter 15 contains 
a rebuttable presumption169 which states that, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, the registered office170 of a debtor-company is presumed to be its COMI.171 
Both the Model Law and the EC Regulation refer to "proof to the contrary", whilst 
Chapter 15 refers to "evidence to the contrary".172 In the Tri-Continental Exchange-
case it was held that the substitution conforms to the US terminology and makes it 
clear that the burden of proof is on the foreign representative who is applying for 
recognition of the foreign proceedings as main proceedings.173 It was held that: 174 
 
The registered office, however, does not otherwise have special evidentiary value 
and does not shift the risk of no persuasion, i.e. the burden of proof, away from the 
foreign representative seeking recognition as a main proceeding. Thus, if the 
foreign proceeding is not in the country of the registered office, then the foreign 
representative has the burden of proof on the question of "centre of main interests". 
                                            
167  However, in the matter of In re Millennium Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Ltd 458 BR 63 
(Bankr SDNY 2011) it was held that the appropriate date at which to determine the COMI of a 
debtor is not the date that the petition for recognition is filed, but on or about the date of the 
commencement of the foreign proceeding for which recognition is sought. See para 76.  
168  See a 3(1) of the EC Regulation. For a discussion, see para 2.1.6 above.  
169  See the matter of In re SPhinX 351 BR 103 2006 371 BR 10 (SDNY) para 117[11], hereafter 
referred to as the SPhinX-case.  
170  "Registered office" refers to the place of incorporation or the equivalent for an entity that is not a 
natural person. See the Tri-Continental Exchange-case.  
171  Contrary to the EC Regulation, Chapter 15 also has a presumption with regard to individuals. S 
1516(c) states that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the habitual residence of an 
individual is presumed to be its COMI.  
172  Article 16(3) of the Model Law states that "[i]n the absence of proof to the contrary, the debtor's 
registered office ... is presumed to be the centre of the debtor's main interests" and a 3(1) of the 
EC Regulation states that "… [i]n the case of a company or legal person, the place of registered 
office shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the absence of proof to the 
contrary".  
173  Tri-Continental Exchange-case para 634[3]. Also see the SPhinX-case para 117[11]. 
174  Tri-Continental Exchange-case para 635[4]-[6].  
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Correlatively, if the foreign proceeding is in the country of the registered office, and 
if there is evidence that the centre of main interests might be elsewhere, then the 
foreign representative must prove that the centre of main interests is in the same 
country as the registered office. 
 
Accordingly, although there is a difference in wording, there seems to be no real 
difference in the meaning of the term. The presumption is "included for speed and 
convenience of proof where there is no serious controversy"175 and may be of less 
weight in the event of a serious dispute.176  
 
In the SPhinX-case177 the debtor (SPhinX Ltd) was a hedge funds corporation which 
was incorporated and registered in the Cayman Islands. The provisional liquidators 
of the corporation applied to the Southern District of New York for recognition of the 
Cayman Island proceedings as main proceedings under Chapter 15.  As Chapter 15 
does not state the type of evidence required to rebut the presumption under section 
1516(c), the court held that there are various factors which could (individually or 
jointly) be relevant to such a determination. These factors are: 
(i)  the location of the debtor's headquarters;  
(ii)  the location of the debtor's management;   
(iii)  the location of the debtor's primary assets;  
(iv)  the location of the majority of the debtor's creditors or of a majority of the 
creditors who would be affected by the case; and/or  
(v)  the jurisdiction whose law would apply to most disputes.178 
 
The court pointed out that these factors should, however, not be applied 
mechanically, but should be viewed in the light of the emphasis on protecting the 
reasonable interests of the parties and the maximisation of the debtor's value 
instead. The court noted that the winding-up proceedings in the Cayman Islands 
would primarily have affected investors who had not opposed the petition for 
recognition of the proceedings as foreign main proceedings. Of significance in this 
                                            
175  This was taken from the text of the US House Report (HR Rep No 109-31 at 113 (2005)). Also 
see Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1033.  
176  See the SPhinX-case para 117[11]. 
177  See the SPhinX-case para 117[11]. 
178  SPhinX-case para 117[12]. The court also took the Eurofood- case into consideration. See para 
2.1.8 above. These factors were reaffirmed in the matter of In re Bear Stearns High-Grade 
Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Ltd 374 BR 122 (Bankr SDNY 2007), hereafter referred 
to as the Bear Stearns-case.  
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matter is the fact that, by taking this factor, inter alia, into account the court went on 
to state that it "might be inclined to find the debtor's COMI in the Cayman Islands 
and recognise the proceedings as foreign main proceedings".179 In its discretion, the 
court declined to do so, however. The decision of the court was based on the fact 
that the application for recognition of the proceedings as foreign main proceedings 
was filed for the improper purpose of obtaining an automatic stay in order to prohibit 
an appeal against the settlement.180 After refusing to recognise the foreign 
insolvency proceedings as foreign main proceedings, the court found the foreign 
proceedings to be non-main proceedings.181 
 
The matter of In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master 
Fund Ltd182 dealt with facts similar to the SPhinX-case.183 The court rejected the 
argument by the petitioners that the court should recognise the foreign proceedings 
as foreign main proceedings because the registered offices of the debtors were in 
the Cayman Islands and no objections had been filed against holding that the 
Cayman Islands proceedings were main proceedings. Judge Lifland held that:184 
                                            
179  This statement caused serious critique. See below. 
180  SphinX-case para 121[14], [15]. 
181  The SphinX-case has been heavily criticised. See, for example, Glosband 2007 American 
Bankruptcy Institute Journal 1-4; Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1024-1028; Chan Ho 2007 
JIBLR 636-641 and the Bear Stearns-case discussed below. Glosband raises three main points 
of criticism against the SPhinX-case. Firstly, the court neglected to apply the eligibility 
requirements for foreign proceedings to qualify for recognition under Chapter 15. Secondly, the 
court disregarded the purely objective and non-discretionary standard for recognition provided 
under Chapter 15. In the third place, the case severs the determination of whether a foreign 
proceeding qualifies as a foreign main proceeding or a foreign non-main proceeding as part of 
the recognition determination. Glosband further criticises the SPhinX-case by stating that the 
judgement "creates a wholly unnecessary, serious and regrettable breach of European case law 
on the meaning of key concepts taken from a European statute. It threatens to break the very 
unanimity that is meant to be at the heart of the Model Law and the goal of uniform interpretation 
throughout the world reflected in §1508". See Glosband 2007 American Bankruptcy Institute 
Journal 1; 4. 
182  In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Ltd 374 BR 122 (Bankr 
SDNY 2007). 
182  SphinX-case para 121[14], [15]. 
183  The debtor companies were registered in the Cayman Islands, but they had no employees or 
managers there. The investment manager and administrator were located in the US and all of the 
liquid assets were in the US.  
184  Bear Stearns-case paras 126[1], 130[7]. This was confirmed in the matter of In re Basis Yield 
Alpha Fund (Master) 381 BR 37 (Bankr SDNY 2008) 40[1]. It is submitted that judge Lifland is 
correct in coming to this decision. The COMI of a debtor must be ascertained by making use of 
objective criteria and is ascertainable by third parties (see para 33 of the Eurofood-case). The 
recognition requirements set out in Chapter 15 are also objective. See Glosband 2007 American 
Bankruptcy Institute Journal 2. Also see para 2.2.6 above. The mere fact that there is no 
objection by creditors and other interested persons to a jurisdiction qualifying as the COMI 
cannot be taken to indicate that the jurisdiction is the COMI, especially where the jurisdiction in 
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Recognition under s.1517 is not to be rubber stamped by the courts. This Court 
must make an independent determination as to whether the foreign proceeding 
meets the definitional requirements of sections 1502 and 1517 of the Bankruptcy 
Code... In so holding, I part with the dicta in the SPhinX decision opining that if the 
parties in interest had not objected to the Cayman Islands proceeding being 
recognised as main, recognition would have been granted under the sole grounds 
that no party objected and no other proceeding had been initiated anywhere else ... 
To the extent that no objection would make the recognition process a rubber stamp 
exercise, this Court disagrees with the dicta in the SPhinX decision. 
 
By taking the Eurofood-case into consideration, the court held that the place where 
the debtor conducted the administration of its interests on a regular basis and was 
therefore ascertainable by third parties was the US. Accordingly, the presumption 
under section 1516(c) was rebutted as the debtor's COMI was held to be situated in 
the US. 
 
In In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd185 the presumption was upheld. The creditors 
of debtor companies (insurance companies incorporated under the laws of St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG)) sought recognition of the debtors' foreign 
liquidation proceedings in SVG under Chapter 15 as foreign non-main proceedings, 
as opposed to main proceedings. The debtors were parties to an insurance scam, as 
they sold insurance policies in the US and Canada without the required insurance 
licences. Their only offices were located in SVG, where they had approximately 
twenty employees. The court found that the debtors conducted regular business 
operations at their registered offices in SVG, in a manner that equated with a 
"principal place of business" under concepts of US law.186 That was sufficient to 
qualify SVG as the COMI of the debtors even though the insurance scam was 
primarily conducted in the US and Canada. Accordingly, the winding-up proceedings 
in SVG were recognised in the US as foreign main proceedings.187  
                                                                                                                                       
question is a tax haven with very few objectively relevant connecting factors pointing to its being 
the COMI. Also see para 2.3.1.1 below for Westbrook's criticism of the SPhinX-case.  
185  In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd 349 BR 627, 47 Bankr Ct Dec 31. 
186  Tri-Continental Exchange-case para [3].  
187  Also see the matter of In re British American Isle of Venice (BVI) Ltd 441 BR 713 (Bankr SD Fla 
2010), where the court held that the COMI of the debtor company, which had been formed under 
the laws of the British Virgin Islands (BVI), was located in BVI. In coming to its decision the  court 
took the following factors into consideration: (i) the headquarters of the debtor was located in 
BVI; (ii) the debtor's liquidator, who had managed the debtor and its subsidiaries since his 
appointment more than a year prior to the court hearing  was located in BVI; (iii) more than eighty 
percent of debtor's total assets were located in BVI; (iv) the debtor's corporate books and records 
were maintained with the debtor's registered agent in BVI; and (v) it was likely that third parties 
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It should be noted that not everyone is pleased with the presumption under section 
1516(c). Adams and Fincke188 submit that the presumption facilitates forum shopping 
in the sense that a debtor-company can easily change its official residency for the 
purpose of filing bankruptcy proceedings in a more favourable jurisdiction. They 
agree with the solution proposed by Bufford189 to make forum shopping more 
difficult, namely establishing a "residency rule". The "residency rule" would require a 
debtor-company to have its COMI in a jurisdiction for a minimum period of time, 
before it can qualify to file a "domestic enterprise-wide" insolvency case. This rule 
would provide judges with the power of looking beyond the COMI of a debtor- 
company in instances where the debtor has not met the minimum requirement of the 
"residency rule". 190 Bufford191 suggests that the minimum period that a debtor's 
COMI should have been located in a jurisdiction before filing for insolvency is six 
months, but a year may even be a more appropriate period. 
 
It is submitted that the residency rule carries merit, as implementation thereof as an 
additional requirement for determining the COMI of a debtor would certainly aid the 
minimisation of "forum shopping". This requirement would be an objective criterion 
(as required by the Eurofood-case) which would support the requirement that the 
COMI of a debtor must be ascertainable by third parties. Creditors and other third 
parties might not immediately take notice of the fact that a debtor had changed 
location (for example, its headquarters) as it might not influence their day-to-day 
business. It is, however, reasonable to presume that after a certain period (six 
months, for example) a change of location would be widely known. Additionally, an 
individual debtor would not be able to side-step the insolvency courts of the 
jurisdiction where he resides by merely emigrating to another country. 
 
It is interesting to note the principle in the EU that the courts of a Member State 
would have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings in respect of a company that 
is incorporated outside the Community if the company's COMI is situated within that 
                                                                                                                                       
considered the debtor's offices in BVI to be its COMI. Accordingly, the court recognised the 
insolvency proceedings in the BVI as foreign main proceedings. 
188  Adams and Fincke 2008-2009 Colum J Eur L 84-85.  
189  Bufford 2005 Am Bankr L J 139.  
190  Adams and Fincke 2008-2009 Colum J Eur L 84-85.  
191  Bufford 2005 Am Bankr L J 139-140. 
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Member State. The only test is if that debtor's COMI is to be found within the relevant 
Member State, irrespective of where it is incorporated. 
 
2.2.7 Corporate groups192 
 
2.2.7.1 The problem with corporate groups 
 
Most multinational corporate empires are corporate groups, often consisting of 
hundreds of legally separate entities.193 Such corporate groups may consist of 
independent subsidiaries, corporations, partnerships, business trusts, 
unincorporated businesses, branches and other entities.194 Therefore, it is surprising 
that neither the EC Regulation, the Model Law nor Chapter 15 currently addresses 
the insolvency of corporate groups (also known as business enterprise groups)195 
operating in multiple jurisdictions as a whole.196 The EC Regulation, the Model Law 
and Chapter 15 currently require that each legal entity should be considered 
separately for the purpose of determining its COMI.197 Adams and Fincke198 submit 
that, whilst this approach had the advantage of predictability, it "creates vast 
economic insufficiencies when multiple courts administer what are essentially 
multiple main cases" in instances when one is dealing with corporate groups.  
 
There is a question of fairness in dealing with how to protect the notion of the 
separate legal personality of each of the entities to a corporate group, whilst creating 
a fair and effective insolvency system that recognises the residual interests of 
creditors. It might happen, for example, that the employees of a subsidiary situated 
in state A work hard to generate great wealth for that subsidiary. The profits of the 
subsidiary are, however, transferred to the parent company situated in state B on a 
                                            
192  This sub-section addresses the problems that arise when dealing with corporate group 
insolvencies under Chapter 15 (which is also a problem under the EC Regulation). See the 
discussion in para 2.1.8 above.  
193  General Motors, for example, is a corporate group that consists of more than 500 corporations. 
See LoPucki 2005 Am Bankr J L 92; Adams and Fincke 2008-2009 Colum J Eur L 83. 
194  See Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 549-551; Adams and Fincke 2008-2009 Colum J Eur L 83. 
195  An "enterprise group" refers to two or more enterprises that are interconnected by control or 
significant ownership. An "enterprise" refers to "an entity, regardless of its legal form, that is 
engaged in economic activities and may be governed by the insolvency law". See the Legislative 
Guide 3-4; Sarra 2008 INSOL Int Insolv Rev 73-122. 
196  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 549-551. 
197  LoPucki 2005 Am Bankr J L 93.  
198  Adams and Fincke 2008-2009 Colum J Eur L 83.  
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daily basis. If the subsidiary in state A should become insolvent in the future, the 
employees may have claims against the subsidiary that has no assets in state A.199  
 
2.2.7.2 Forms of corporate groups 
 
The discussion to follow distinguishes between the two form of corporate groups, 
namely independently operated groups and highly integrated groups. 
 
a) Independently operated groups 
 
The respective entities of the group may operate relatively independently of one 
another (constituting truly separate legal entities) but simultaneously have a 
considerable amount of control exercised between these entities. When one or more 
of the entities of a corporate group goes insolvent, the creditors located in the place 
of registration of each of these entities will seek to make use of domestic law to 
realize their claims. According to Sarra,200 in instances where the entities of the 
group operate independently from one another, it might not pose a huge problem to 
deal with the insolvency of each separate legal entity.201 
 
b) Highly integrated groups 
 
 A corporate group can be highly integrated and operated or governed as a single 
global unit of which the capital structure thereof is centralized, in the sense that a 
parent company or business entity wholly owns and largely controls its subsidiaries 
(each of which has its own separate legal personality). Sarra202 submits that in 
instances where one is dealing with such a highly integrated corporate group, the 
insolvency proceedings in each of the jurisdictions can pose huge problems, which 
could result in premature liquidation of the multinational enterprise in order to satisfy 
the multiple claims of creditors located in multiple jurisdictions. 
 
                                            
199  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 551.  
200  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 549-551; Westbrook 2002 Am Bankr L J 38. 
201  See para 2.1.8 above for a discussion on the position under the EC Regulation.  
202  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 549-551. 
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2.2.7.3 Proposed solutions in the US context 
The ALI Principles propose two innovative rules concerning subsidiaries.203 Firstly, a 
subsidiary should be allowed to file for insolvency in the home country of its parent 
company in order to reorganise on a group basis, even if it would not ordinarily be 
allowed. This would allow the group to reorganise administratively in a single 
jurisdiction, which would lead to saving time and costs. Secondly, corporate groups 
should be reorganised from a worldwide perspective, just as within a single 
company, but subject to the necessity of allocating value with regard to the corporate 
form. This will lead to maximised cooperation and coordination, despite the 
necessary legal adjustments that have to be made in order to reflect the rights that 
arise from different claimants that have rights against different entities.204  
 
LoPucki205 submits that the most sensible solution to the corporate group problem is 
to administer highly integrated groups together in the COMI of the corporate group 
as a whole, whilst administering the independently operated corporate group entities 
separately in each of their respective COMI's. Bufford206 states that the solution 
proposed by LoPucki on this point is "exactly correct".207 Adams and Fincke208 also 
agree with the proposed solution and submit that a legal framework which allows for 
the reorganisation or liquidation of an entire economic unit would be of more 
advantage than one that dealt with the corporate parts separately.209 
                                            
203  See Procedural Principles 23 and 24 of the ALI Principles 12. Procedural Principle 17 states that 
in instances where there are parallel proceedings and assets are to be sold, the domestic 
administrator of each proceeding should seek to sell the assets in cooperation with other 
administrators in order to produce the maximum value for the assets of the debtor as a whole, 
across national borders. The relevant domestic courts should subsequently approve such sales. 
This entails that the assets should be sold to realise the greatest value for all creditors worldwide, 
despite any lost advantage that the local creditors in a specific jurisdiction might have had if a 
territorial approach had been followed. The local creditors will accordingly have no say if 
territorial proceedings would be to their advantage, but universal proceedings would produce the 
greatest value of the sold assets (being more advantageous to the concursus creditorum as a 
whole). This is simply an application of the general principle of "modified universalism" that 
realising assets and sharing the value of the proceeds should take place on a worldwide basis 
rather than on a territorial basis. See Westbrook 2002 Am Bankr L J 38.  
204  Westbrook 2002 Am Bankr L J 38.  
205  LoPucki 2005 Am Bankr J L 94.  
206  Bufford 2005 Am Bankr L J 136-137. 
207  Bufford states that "the universalist solution is to modify the COMI definition to provide that the 
corporate group venue decision is based on the collective COMI of all of the legal entities that 
operate together as an integrated economic unit." See Bufford 2005 Am Bankr L J 136. 
208  Adams and Fincke 2008-2009 Colum J Eur L 83-84. 
209  Mevorach also agrees that "global group-wide solutions" should be applied to integrated 
corporate groups that face CBI and that the insolvency proceedings of an integrated multinational 
enterprise should be centralised. The unification or centralisation of the insolvency of affiliates of 
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The determining factor will accordingly be the degree of economic integration within 
the corporate group. None of LoPucki, Bufford, or Adams and Fincke suggest a 
method for determining the degree of economic integration between companies 
belonging to the same group. Bufford, Adams and Fincke do, however, state that 
specialised bankruptcy courts might be necessary. It is thus evident that the 
determination of the COMI of a corporate group will require a more sophisticated 
judiciary and a more complex economic analysis. Judges will accordingly need 
appropriate training due to the complexity of the matters. When making a 
determination as to the economic integration of a company, there will have to be an 
enquiry into the functional realities of its corporate administration as well as its 
corporate and financial structure. 210  
 
Sarra211 points out the disadvantages of the approach suggested above. According 
to her, a "business enterprise group COMI" may prove problematic for the rights of 
creditors in several of the corporate group jurisdictions. Problems might arise where 
a creditor located in a specific jurisdiction deals with a debtor-company in the 
jurisdiction where it is registered and subsequently institutes a claim and would like a 
remedy in that jurisdiction. Additionally, the recognition of a "business enterprise 
group COMI" will create an "inappropriate extension of domestic law" of a 
jurisdiction, which could prejudice the creditors located in other jurisdictions where 
the distribution priority differs. The COMI-test does not really make provision for 
corporate enterprise groups, unless they are so highly integrated that a court can 
"pull aside the corporate veil", which is a rare occurrence.212 
 
As an alternative solution to overcome some barriers in determining the COMI of a 
business enterprise group, Sarra213 proposes the implementation of protocols, also 
                                                                                                                                       
a corporate group will probably result in maximised wealth and the reduction of costs and will 
promote reorganisations. See Mevorach Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups 327. 
For further reading on Mevorach's views regarding the centralisation of insolvency proceedings 
relating to integrated multinational enterprises, see Ronen-Mevorach 2006 JBL 468-486; 
Mevorach 2008 ICLQ 427-448; and Mevorach 2011 JBL 666-681. 
210  See Adams and Fincke 2008-2009 Colum J Eur L 84; Bufford 2005 Am Bankr L J 137.  
211  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 561-562. 
212  It is submitted that the reservations expressed by Sarra are not unfounded. See para 2.2.7.4 
below.  
213  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 562. 
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known as "cross-border agreements".214 Protocols can allow parties to negotiate 
cross-border cooperation, which includes recognition of procedural coordination and 
substantive consolidation to be applied when a business enterprise group is 
liquidated or wound up.215 These two forms of cooperation, which are discussed 
below, are found in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (the 
Legislative Guide),216 which deals with the treatment of enterprise groups in 
insolvency. 
 
i)  Procedural coordination 
 
Procedural coordination entails that all of the assets and liabilities of each member of 
the corporate group involved in the procedural coordination remain separate and 
distinct from one another.217 Procedural coordination accordingly allows for the 
coordination of proceedings in multiple jurisdictions in respect of multiple members of 
a group enterprise.218 The integrity and identity of each of the members and the 
substantive rights of creditors are preserved. The effect of procedural coordination is 
limited to the administrative aspects of the proceedings. It does not concern any 
substantive rights of the creditors. The claim of a creditor may not exceed the value 
of the assets of the particular group member to which the claim relates.219 An order 
for procedural coordination may streamline multiple proceedings in various ways.  It 
may involve, for example, the appointment of a single insolvency representative, the 
establishment of a single creditor committee, cooperation among two or more courts 
(including the coordination or combining of hearings), cooperation between 
insolvency representatives (including the sharing of information and the coordination 
of negotiations), the joint provision of notice, coordination between creditor 
                                            
214  Protocols are mechanisms that are often used to establish cross-border cooperation and 
coordination among corporate groups. Protocols set out the importance of comity and 
cooperation whilst recognising that each court is entitled to exercise its independent jurisdiction 
and authority regarding the matter before the court. See Stroebel Protocols as a Possible 
Solution 28; Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 562. 
215  The courts in the relevant jurisdiction approve such protocols. See Stroebel Protocols as a 
Possible Solution 29; Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 576.   
216  UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part Three: Treatment of Enterprise Groups in 
Insolvency (2010) (the Legislative Guide). 
217  See the Legislative Guide 4 for the definition of procedural coordination. Procedural coordination 
has two main purposes, namely (i) the facilitation of the administration of insolvency proceedings, 
whilst respecting the separate legal personality of each of the group members and (ii) the 
promotion of cost-efficiency and betters returns to creditors. See the Legislative Guide 27.  
218  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 564.  
219  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 565.  
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committees, the coordination of procedures for the submission and verification of 
claims, and the coordination of avoidance proceedings. The scope and extent of the 
procedural coordination should be specified by the court. 220 
 
A court may order procedural coordination at the request of a person permitted to 
make an application or on its own initiative. The coordination might either involve 
different courts221 competent in respect to different group members, or a single court 
that is competent in respect of a number of different insolvency proceedings.222 The 
court should specify the scope and extent of the procedural coordination. A court 
may take appropriate steps to coordinate with any other court by means of 
procedural coordination of the insolvency proceedings concerning two or more 
enterprise group members.223 
 
The Legislative Guide stipulates that the insolvency laws of each state should say 
that the administration of insolvency proceedings regarding two or more enterprise 
group members224 may be coordinated for procedural purposes.225 The persons who 
are permitted to apply for procedural coordination are: 
(a)  an enterprise group member that is subject to an application for the 
commencement of insolvency proceedings or subject to insolvency 
proceedings; 
(b)  the insolvency representative of an enterprise group member; or 
(c) a creditor of an enterprise group member that is subject to an application for 
the commencement of insolvency proceedings or subject to insolvency 
proceedings.226 
 
                                            
220  See the Legislative Guide 23-24, 28 (para 204) .  
221  Although it is not clear from the Legislative Guide, it is presumed that the courts concerned may 
be located in different jurisdictions or states (thus, different courts within the USA as well as 
courts from other states such as Canada, for instance).  
222  Para 203 of the Legislative Guide 27.  
223  Para 207 of the Legislative Guide 28.  
224  Although not expressly stated in the Legislative Guide, it is presumed that this provision covers 
instances where two or more group members are located in the same jurisdiction or different 
jurisdictions.  
225  Para 202 of the Legislative Guide 27. An application for procedural coordination may be made at 
the same time as an application for the commencement of insolvency proceedings or at any 
subsequent time. Para 205 of the Legislative Guide 28. 
226  Para 206 of the Legislative Guide 27. A creditor does not have to be a creditor of all the group 
members in respect of which it is seeking procedural coordination in order to be eligible to make 
an application for procedural coordination. See para 208 of the Legislative Guide 28.  
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ii)  Substantive consolidation 
The Legislative Guide provides that, in general, the insolvency laws of each state 
should respect the separate legal identity of each member of an enterprise group.227 
There are only two exceptions to this general principle where a court228 may order 
substantive consolidation.229 The first exception is where a court is satisfied that the 
assets or liabilities of the enterprise group members are intermingled to such an 
extent that the ownership of assets and the responsibility for liabilities cannot be 
identified without disproportionate expense or delay.230 There are various factors that 
are relevant in determining whether or not substantive consolidation will be justified. 
These standards are set out in paragraph 220 of the Legislative Guide and include 
the presence of consolidated financial statements for the whole enterprise group, if 
there is a single bank account used by all of the the members of the group, the unity 
of interests and ownership between the various group members, and whether or not 
there are intra-group loans.231 The second exception is where a court is satisfied that 
enterprise group members are engaged in a fraudulent scheme or activity that has 
no legitimate business purpose and substantive consolidation is essential to rectify 
that scheme or activity.232 The type of fraud referred to in this context means the 
instance where there is a total absence of a legitimate business purpose which may 
relate to the reasons for which the corporate group was formed, or activities 
undertaken by the corporate group after it came into existence.233  
 
                                            
227  Para 219 of the Legislative Guide 58. Also see the matter of In re Owens Corning 419 F3d 195 
(3rd Cir 2005) 211[8]-[12].  
228  The relevant court here is the court having jurisdiction over the commencement and conduct of 
the insolvency proceedings, which includes matters arising in the course of such proceedings. 
See recommendation 13 of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part One 
(2005) 44.  
229  The circumstances that support substantive consolidation are very limited and are subject to 
strict evidentiary rules. This is due to the effects of substantive consolidation, including that it 
overturns the separate entity principle and the potential unfairness caused to a single creditor 
group or one member group when forced to share pari passu with the creditors of a less solvent 
group member. See the Legislative Guide 50. 
230  Para 220 of the Legislative Guide 58-59.  
231  For further elements, see para 112 of the Legislative Guide 51 and Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 
571-572. 
232  Para 220 of the Legislative Guide 58-59.  
233  An example of such fraud would be where a debtor transfers all of its assets to a newly-formed 
entity or to a self-owned entity in order to preserve those assets for its own benefit and to hinder, 
delay or defraud its creditors. See para 114 of the Legislative Guide 52.  
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Accordingly, substantive consolidation234 entails the treatment of the assets and 
liabilities of two or more enterprise group members as if they were part of a single 
insolvent estate,235 thereby disregarding the separate legal personality of each of the 
group members. The assets of the members of the group are accordingly treated as 
if they were part of a single estate, for the general benefit of all of the creditors of the 
consolidated group, and claims against group members included in the order are 
treated as if they were claims against the single insolvent estate. The claims and 
debts between group members included in the order are extinguished.236 
 
Sarra237 submits that courts should seek to minimize the degree of prejudice that 
creditors may suffer due to the substantive consolidation order. Courts should do this 
by carefully considering the amount, degree and type of prejudice that creditors may 
suffer238 and whether or not the potential benefits239 of substantive consolidation 
outweigh that prejudice to creditors.240  
 
An application for substantive consolidation may be made together with an 
application for the commencement of insolvency proceedings with respect to 
enterprise group members or at any subsequent time. The insolvency law should 
therefore specify the persons that are permitted to make an application for 
substantive consolidation, that may include an enterprise group member, a creditor, 
or the insolvency representative of any such enterprise group member.241  
                                            
234  Which will be granted only where there is compliance with one of the two recognised exceptional 
circumstances discussed above.  
235  Legislative Guide 4. Substantive consolidation has three main purposes. Firstly, it provides 
legislative authority for substantive consolidation, while at the same time respecting the basic 
principle of the separate legal identity of each member to an enterprise group. Secondly, it 
specifies the very limited circumstances in which the remedy of substantive consolidation may be 
available in order to ensure transparency and predictability. Thirdly, it specifies the effect of an 
order for substantive consolidation, which includes the treatment of security interests. See the 
Legislative Guide 58. 
236  Legislative Guide 49, 59 (para 224). 
237  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 571. 
238  A court should, for example, consider whether the creditors that might be prejudiced will have the 
opportunity to make submissions to court. The court should not order substantive consolidation 
where it would cause smaller creditors and employee groups not to have the opportunity to 
participate in hearings in a foreign jurisdiction. See Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 571.   
239  The potential benefits include harmonising and coordinating activities and promoting orderly and 
efficient administration of proceedings.  
240  The court should accordingly "balance the promotion of international cooperation" on the one 
hand and the "respect for independence and integrity of domestic proceedings" on the other 
hand. See Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 571. 
241  Paras 222 and 223 of the Legislative Guide 59. 
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An important provision of the Legislative Guide is that the priorities established under 
the insolvency law of the state and applicable to individual enterprise group 
members prior to an order for substantive consolidation should, as far as possible, 
be recognised in the substantive consolidation.242 This entails that, in instances 
where a creditor has an employee claim (which is a priority claim) in respect of a 
specific group member, the creditor's priority should (as far as possible) be 
recognised in the substantive consolidation of the enterprise group as a whole.  
 
The court granting the order for substantive consolidation may exclude specified 
assets and claims from that order and specify the circumstances in which those 
exclusions might be ordered.243 Generally, the rights and priorities of a creditor 
holding a security interest over an asset of an enterprise group member should, as 
far as possible, be respected in substantive consolidation. The Legislative Guide, 
however, gives meaningful exceptions where this principle will not be applied, 
namely where: 
(a)  the secured indebtedness is owed solely between enterprise group members 
and will be extinguished by an order for substantive consolidation; 
(b)  it is determined that the security interest was obtained by fraud in which the 
creditor participated; or 
(c)  the transaction granting the security interest is subject to avoidance in 
accordance with recommendations 87, 88 and 217.244 
 
Substantive consolidation orders have been approved by US courts in the past.245 In 
In re Owens Corning246 the United States Court of Appeals considered the 
                                            
242  Para 226 of the Legislative Guide 60.  
243  Para 221 of the Legislative Guide 59. This is known as partial substantive consolidation. Such 
exclusions will be rare, however. The circumstances where an asset might be excluded are 
where the ownership of a specific assets can be identified, where part of the business activities 
of the consolidated group can be separated from the rest as not being part of the fraudulent 
scheme, where including the assets might worsen the consequences of a fraudulent scheme, or 
where assets are burdensome in the sense that they would be difficult to administer or carry an 
environmental liability. See para 136 of the Legislative Guide 57. Also see Sarra 2008-2009 Tex 
Int'l L J 567.  
244  Para 225 of the Legislative Guide 59. Plainly put, this is where impeachable dispositions 
occurred (eg voidable preference, undue preference and collusive disposition).  
245  See, for example, the matter of In re Owens Corning 419 F3d 195 (3rd Cir 2005); Soviero v 
National Bank of Long Island 328 F2d 446 (2d Cir 1964); In re Commercial Envelope Mfg Co 3 
Bankr Ct Dec 647 1977 WL 182366 (Bankr SDNY 1977); Genesis Health Ventures Inc v 
Stapleton (In re Genesis Health Ventures Inc) 402 F3d 416, 423 (3rd Cir 2005). See Sarra 2008-
2009 Tex Int'l L J 569.  
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circumstances in which the substantive consolidation of a business enterprise group 
could take place. The court held that substantive consolidation exists as an equitable 
remedy247 which may be available in two circumstances. The first instance is where 
the entities of the corporate group disregarded the separateness of the corporate 
entity so significantly that their creditors relied on the breakdown of entity borders 
and treated them as one legal entity. This is a new factor additional to those factors 
referred to in paragraph 220 of the Legislative Guide discussed above. The second 
instance is that in which their assets and liabilities are so scrambled that separating 
them would be costly and would harm all creditors.248 This factor is noted in 
paragraph 220 of the Legislative Guide. The court further provided certain principles 
that should be considered when determining whether or not substantive 
consolidation would be appropriate in a given matter. The first principle, which has 
already been referred to above, is that courts should generally respect the 
separateness of an entity in the absence of compelling circumstances that call equity 
into play.249 Furthermore, the court added three additional principles that have not 
yet been referred to.  These factors are (i) there must be more gained from 
substantive consolidation than mere administrative convenience;250 (ii) substantive 
consolidation should rarely be applied and qualifies as a remedy of last resort after 
the consideration and rejection of other possible available remedies;251 and (iii) 
substantive consolidation may not be used offensively in order to tactically 
disadvantage certain creditors, but will be justified only when every creditor will 
benefit from such consolidation.252 
 
2.2.7.4 Summary  
 
None of the Model Law, the EC Regulation or Chapter 15 currently addresses the 
problems associated with the insolvency of an enterprise group. Each of the 
                                                                                                                                       
246  In re Owens Corning 419 F3d 195 (3rd Cir 2005).  
247 In re Owens Corning 419 F3d 195 (3rd Cir 2005) para 210[7].  
248  In re Owens Corning 419 F3d 195 (3rd Cir 2005) para 211[13-15].  
249  The harms that are addressed by substantive consolidation are nearly always those caused by 
the debtors who disregarded the principle of separateness.  
250  For example, allowing a court to simplify a matter by avoiding other issues or making post 
petition accounting more convenient are hardly sufficient reasons to allow substantive 
consolidation. 
251  There should be no possibility of more precise remedies under the US Bankruptcy Code.   
252  In re Owens Corning 419 F3d 195 (3rd Cir 2005) para 211[8-12]. For a further discussion on the 
matter, see Sarra 2008 INSOL Int Insolv Rev 97-99.  
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members of the enterprise group should be regarded separately for the purpose of 
determining each of their COMIs. This position poses no problem when one is 
dealing with an independently operated group. This approach may, however, pose 
problems when one is dealing with a highly integrated enterprise group. Locating the 
separate COMI of each group member might pose a major task which is excessively 
time and cost consuming and consequently might not even be to the advantage of 
creditors.  
 
Various academics have proposed solutions to this problem. LoPucki, Bufford, 
Adams and Fincke all agree that in such instances the enterprise group should be 
administered in the COMI of the enterprise group as a whole. Sarra proposes that 
cross-border agreements (or protocols) should be implemented in such situations. 
These cross-border agreements might either provide for procedural coordination of 
the administrative aspects of the insolvencies of the separate group members, or for 
substantive consolidation of the enterprise group as a single unit. Substantive 
consolidation will occur in instances (i) where the group members are highly 
integrated, (ii) where the entities of the corporate group disregarded the 
separateness of the corporate entity so significantly that their creditors relied on the 
breakdown of entity borders and treated them as one legal entity, or (iii) where the 
group members were engaged in fraudulent schemes. This solution seems to 
identify the interests of the creditors as a whole as the determinative factor. In 
instances where one is dealing with an enterprise group and it would be to the 
advantage of the creditors as a whole that each of the group members be liquidated 
separately, an order for procedural cooperation could be made to make the 
individual liquidations quicker and cheaper. In instances where it would be to the 
advantage of the creditors as a whole, substantive consolidation of the whole group 
could be ordered.253 However, it is submitted that the protocol solution may be 
idealistic in the sense that it is highly improbable that a protocol will exist in every 
jurisdiction where corporate groups operate. 
 
                                            
253  The Legislative Guide complements the Model Law. As Chapter 15 is based on the Model Law, it 
should not be very difficult to incorporate the principle contained in the Legislative Guide 
concerning CBI matters in the US. It seems that these principles may have already been 
incorporated in the US through the Owens-case.  
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2.2.8 EU adoption of the Model Law 
 
Currently the EU has not yet adopted the Model Law. This is probably due to the fact 
that it has the EC Regulation to rely upon in CBI matters. It should, however, be kept 
in mind that the EC Regulation only has intra-community application.254 The question 
that arises is what happens in instances where the CBI of a debtor involves non-
Member States.  
 
Westbrook255 submits that the adoption of the Model Law by the EU Member States 
would serve some important purposes. Firstly, such an adoption would be regarded 
as "a very friendly gesture" in other countries. Secondly, adopting the Model Law 
would produce a uniform law within the EU as to CBI matters concerning non-EU 
companies.256 Up to now, the Model Law has been adopted by only five EU 
countries,257 which seems to be no more than a start. It is submitted that all other EU 
countries should adopt the Model Law, which would provide a legal framework when 
dealing with CBI matters that involve non-EU countries. This would contribute to 
legal certainly and the harmonisation of international insolvency law.  
 
2.3 The presumption of incorporation under the EC Regulation and Chapter 
15 
 
After discussions concerning the presumption of incorporation when determining the 
COMI of an enterprise under the EC Regulation258 and Chapter 15259 respectively, 
the question arises as to whether or not there is a divergence between the EC 
Regulation and Chapter 15 as to the weight to be placed upon the presumption in 
favour of the jurisdiction of incorporation. 
 
                                            
254  Wessels International Insolvency Law 235.  
255  Westbrook 2002 Am Bankr L J 39-40. 
256  The EC Regulation is applicable to CBI matters only where the COMI of the debtors is situated 
within the EU. See a 3(1) and Recital 22 of the EC Regulation. See the discussion in para 2.1.7 
above.  
257  These countries are Great Brittan, Greece, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. See UNCITRAL 
1997 www.uncitral.org for a list of all of the countries that have adopted the Model Law.   
258  See para 2.1.6 above.  
259  See para 2.2.6 above.  
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2.3.1 Westbrook's opinion regarding the interpretation of COMI under Chapter 15 
Westbrook260 suggests that there are two policy factors that should influence the 
best standard for determining the COMI under Chapter 15, namely predictability and 
the likely quality of the substantive law of the chosen jurisdiction.261 Each of these 
factors will be discussed below.  
 
2.3.1.1 Predictability 
 
A balance should be struck between flexibility on the one hand and the utmost 
predictability on the other hand when determining the COMI of a debtor. It is quite 
possible that the creditors of a corporation may rely upon the laws of the state of its 
incorporation or principal place of business to regulate the management of the 
general default by such corporation.262  
 
Westbrook263 criticizes the SPhinX-case264 by stating that the case  
 
[c]arries the flexible interpretation of COMI to an extreme. The analysis of the 
court's opinion offers much to admire at specific points, but overall it seems to 
virtually eliminate predictability in determining COMI, consigning each case to the 
unrestrained discretion of the judge.  
 
The implicit rule derived from the SPhinX-case is that the creditors and other 
interested parties may simply agree upon the COMI of a debtor and can be deemed 
to have done so if they have not affirmatively objected to the proposed COMI.265 
According to Westbrook266 this boils down to finding that the COMI of a debtor could 
be "based purely on creditor consent". The SPhinX-case therefore essentially 
eliminates predictability and transparency in CBI matters. It is submitted that 
Westbrook's view is not unfounded, due to the fact that, although Chapter 15 gives 
                                            
260  Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1022. 
261  Westbrook submits that both these factors are important when interpreting COMI, but that the 
factors may differ in importance between the Model Law and the EC Regulation, which would 
cause differences in the interpretation of COMI under the two instruments. See Westbrook 2006-
2007 Brook L Int'l L 1022. 
262  In the matter of Canada S Ry Co v Gebhard 109 US 527, 537-538 (1883) it was held that every 
person who deals with a foreign corporation implicitly subjects himself to the laws of the foreign 
government where the corporation is located.  
263  Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1024. 
264  See para 2.2.6 above. 
265  See Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1025. 
266  Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1025. 
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the courts discretion to grant or deny relief, the recognition of foreign proceedings 
and the subsequent finding of such proceedings to be main or non-main invokes 
objective principles to which effect must be given.267   
 
Westbrook goes on to criticise the Eurofood-case268 by stating that it 
"overemphasises predictability". In this matter the question before the ECJ was 
whether, under the provisions of the EC Regulation, the debtor's COMI was situated 
in the place of its incorporation (Ireland) or the place of its administration (Italy). 
Relying heavily upon the provisions of section 3(1) of the EC Regulation,269 the ECJ 
held that the debtor's COMI was located in Ireland, where it was incorporated. The 
overemphasis on predictability circles around creditor reliance. The US has "weak 
laws regarding the disclosure of the jurisdiction of incorporation" to creditors.270 In 
this regard Westbrook271 states that the alleged importance of a creditor's reliance 
"rests on the shaky and undemonstrated premise of creditor knowledge and reliance 
without even a strong intuition that it is true".272 Additionally, corporations are often 
incorporated in so-called "tax havens".273 If there were to be a strong presumption 
that the COMI of a debtor is its jurisdiction of incorporation in such an instance, the 
laws of the "tax haven" might be applicable, laws which might not be transparent to 
the majority of legal practitioners.274 
                                            
267  See para 2.2.4 above. Also see Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1026. 
268  See para 2.1.8 above.  
269  Article 3(1) of the EC Regulation states that, in the case of a company or legal person, its place 
of registration will be presumed to be its COMI, in the absence of proof to the contrary. Also see 
para 2.1.6 above.  
270  If the law of a country requires that a corporation must disclose the jurisdiction of its incorporation 
on every piece of paper it emitted, this would substantially increase the plausibility of the reliance 
on the jurisdiction of incorporation by creditors. Currently, there seems to be no country with such 
requirements.  
271  Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1029. 
272  It is submitted that although this contention may have merit, the creditors of a debtor-company 
might very easily be able to obtain information concerning that debtor's jurisdiction of 
incorporation from various sources. These sources include the internet (for example the website 
of the debtor), a contract concluded with the debtor, the constitution of incorporation of the debtor 
that might be available, making an enquiry from the registries office, or merely directly contacting 
the debtor and making such an enquiry. Large creditors of a debtor-company will presumably be 
well informed of the status of such a debtor before concluding an agreement with the debtor, 
including where it was incorporated. If the creditor were a bank for example, the debtor might 
have to disclose its jurisdiction of incorporation (among other things) in order to obtain such 
credit.  
273  See, for example, the SPhinX-case and the Bear Stearns-case, in both of which the debtor was 
incorporated in the Cayman Islands, which is regarded as a "tax haven". 
274  Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1030. This contention is supported by an abundance of 
case law (for example the SPhinX-case, the Bear Stearns-case and the Tri-Continental-case 
discussed above). Accordingly it seems that "tax havens" are a major concern in the US and 
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2.3.1.2 Acceptability of the substantive law 
 
The substantive law of the jurisdiction where main insolvency proceedings take place 
will have an important influence on outcomes under the Model Law. Accordingly, 
when interpreting COMI under Chapter 15, the likely quality of the substantive law of 
the COMI jurisdiction should be taken into account to a certain extent. Westbrook275  
submits that, when "tax havens" are considered, it is unlikely that there will be a276   
 
[r]obust, fair and transparent reorganisation process designed to save jobs and 
preserve communities through a financial restructuring or a sale of assets. The lack 
of these opportunities will create externalities that other jurisdictions must bear, 
while [the tax haven] enjoys the professional fees associated with liquidation.  
 
There is, however, a reason why the quality of the substantive law of the COMI 
jurisdiction should be taken into account to a certain extent only. As the Model Law 
follows a system of "modified universalism", it must accept different substantive 
outcomes due to the differences in policy judgements. The problem that arises when 
the substantive law of a tax haven is applicable is that it is "too likely to fall outside 
the range of acceptable outcomes". Additionally, the substantive law of the tax haven 
may also "lack essential procedural characteristics" such as an acceptable judicial 
system and adequate transparency.277 Courts might accordingly rely upon the public 
policy exception278 in order to apply the domestic law, which in turn reverts to 
territorialism. 
 
Westbrook279 is accordingly of the opinion that the COMI concept should not be 
interpreted under Chapter 15 in such a way as to allow a tax haven to serve as the 
COMI of a multinational corporation in instances where the headquarters and 
operations are located in other jurisdictions. If the presumption under section 1516(c) 
                                                                                                                                       
Westbrook argues that the presumption under s 1516(c) should be applied carefully when a "tax 
haven" could possibly qualify as the COMI of a debtor, especially when the substantive 
acceptability of the insolvency laws of the "tax haven" is questionable.  See the discussion in 
para 2.3.1.2 below.  
275  Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1031. 
276  Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1031. 
277  Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1032. 
278  Section 1505 of Chapter 15 states that nothing contained in Chapter 15 prevents a court from 
refusing to take an action governed by Chapter 15 if the action would be manifestly contrary to 
the public policy of the US. A 6 of the South African Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 
(which is also based on the Model Law, like Chapter 15) contains a similar provision.  
279  Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1032.  
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were to be relied upon too heavily, this might however just be the position. 
Accordingly, interpreting COMI in the most predictable way might not be the best 
solution under Chapter 15.  
 
2.3.1.3 Is there a divergence in the approaches evident above? 
 
According to Westbrook,280 the position with regard to the interpretation of COMI 
under the EC Regulation and Chapter 15 seems to differ. The Eurofood-case in 
which the court relied heavily upon the presumption in favour of incorporation was 
based on mutual trust between the Member States.281 If the courts in an EU country 
assume that the insolvency laws of each EU Member State are reasonably 
transparent and comply with reasonable commercial expectations, much of the 
objection against a strong presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of incorporation 
disappears.282 With regard to CBI matters there are, however, important differences 
between cooperation between EU Member States under the EC Regulation on the 
one hand, and cooperation among countries (such as the US with its Chapter 15) in 
terms of the Model Law on the other hand. Westbrook283 accordingly submits that 
the interpretation of the same COMI phrase may legitimately diverge in two contexts, 
by stating that: 284 
 
[d]espite having the same standard in both the EU Regulation and the Model Law, it 
is plausible that it will be permissible to interpret them somewhat differently. The 
reason is that predictability can safely be given more weight in the EU on the 
assumption that all member states have laws and procedures within the acceptable 
range and none of them are havens. 
 
It should be kept in mind that whilst the EC Regulation has only regional application, 
Chapter 15 has international application. The EC Regulation was drafted specifically 
to suit the needs and circumstances of the EU Member States and applies only in 
the "controlled environment" of the EU. The presumption contained in section 
                                            
280  Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1034. 
281  See para 39-40 of the Eurofood-case.  
282  Especially with the "safety-valve" created by the ECJ, entailing that mere "letter-box" 
headquarters are excluded. See Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1034.  
283  Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1035.  
284  Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1040. It should immediately be admitted that the writers 
know too little about tax havens' substantive insolvency laws to unconditionally express well-
informed opinion on this view of Westbrook. 
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1516(c) of the Model Law was taken from the EC Regulation, but the Model Law 
does not function in the same environment and circumstances as the EC 
Regulation.285 Accordingly, it follows logically that there will be a divergence in 
approach, as the US has to deal with the problem of "tax havens" and possibly 
inadequate substantive law, fators which are not experienced in the EU. 
 
2.3.2 Chan Ho's opinion regarding the interpretation of COMI under Chapter 15 
 
Chan Ho286 agrees with Westbrook that there appears to be a divergence with 
regard to the weight that is to be placed on the presumption in favour of the debtor's 
registered office as COMI under the EC Regulation and Chapter 15. The 
interpretation of COMI is nevertheless correct under each of these instruments as 
the COMI concept performs different functions under each instrument. Under the EC 
Regulation, the COMI concept determines which jurisdiction will be able to open 
main insolvency proceedings. Under Chapter 15, however, the COMI concept merely 
determines the nature of the foreign insolvency proceedings287 and does not 
determine the jurisdiction that opens the insolvency proceedings at all.288 
Accordingly, the COMI concept "plays a much more significant role" under the EC 
Regulation than under Chapter 15.289 Chan Ho explains further that: 290 
 
[w]hen one is concerned with the monopoly of jurisdiction to open insolvency 
proceedings within the EU, the certainty of jurisdiction becomes much more 
important for a host of reasons.  ....  On the other hand, the Model Law may tolerate 
more uncertainty with regard to the location of COMI. Provided a foreign proceeding 
may be recognised as either a main or a non-main proceeding, there is plenty of 
scope for the recognising court to tailor its relief according to the circumstances of 
the case. "Flexibility in granting, modifying or denying relief and in communicating 
and coordinating among multiple proceedings is a hallmark of chapter 15".  
 
Based on the function of each instrument, It is submitted that this contention of Chan 
Ho's is acceptable. However, Chan Ho's submission that the Model Law "may 
                                            
285  It applies internationally in an "uncontrolled environment".  
286  Chan Ho 2007 JIBLR 639. 
287  The foreign proceedings can qualify either as main proceedings or non-main proceedings, or 
may otherwise not qualify as foreign insolvency proceedings under Chapter 15 at all.  
288  Chan Ho 2007 JIBLR 639. Should there be recognition of foreign main proceedings, it "just 
produces automatic effects under s 1520 that can be modified for cause". See Glosband 2007 
American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 3.  
289  Glosband 2007 American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 3.  
290  Chan Ho 2007 JIBLR 639. 
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tolerate more uncertainty with regard to the location of COMI" is questionable, as 
practical application thereof will lead to legal uncertainty. It is submitted that there 
are objective requirements that need to be complied with in order to qualify either as 
foreign main proceeding or foreign non-main proceedings and the distinction 
between the two should not be blurred due to a desire for flexibility.  
 
2.3.3 Sarra's opinion regarding the interpretation of COMI under Chapter 15 
 
According to Sarra291 the EU countries and the US have "diverged in their approach" 
to the COMI concept. The Eurofood-decision sets a high threshold for rebutting the 
presumption in article 3(1) of the EC Regulation, which wording is similar to the 
presumption contained in section 1516(c) of Chapter 15. The US courts, on the other 
hand, make use of a "command and control" test when ascertaining where the COMI 
of a debtor is located.292 In the Muscletech Research and Development-case, the US 
and Canadian courts agreed that the COMI of the debtor was located in Canada. 
The factors that the courts took into consideration in reaching this decision were the 
debtor's place of registration; the place of decision-making; where the financial 
control and banking was located; and operational and administrative factors. In 
support of her viewpoint Sarra heavily relies upon the following quote of Judge 
Markell in the Betcorp-case:293 
 
[t]his inquiry examines the debtor's administration, management, and operations, 
along with whether reasonable and ordinary third parties can discern or perceive 
where the debtor is conducting these various functions. 
 
 
Sarra294 also states that the significance of the US approach to COMI concerning a 
multinational enterprise is that in instances where the operations thereof "are highly 
integrated and centralized in the jurisdiction of one entity" (for example the parent 
company), the courts may find that the COMI of the other entities is situated in the 
                                            
291  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 555.  
292  Sarra refers to the SPhinX-case, the Bear Stearns-case, the matter of In re Muscletech Research 
and Development Order of Judge Rakoff 04 MD 1598, 06 Civ 538 (SDNY) (hereafter referred to 
as the Muscletech Research and Development-case) and the matter of In re Betcorp Ltd 400 BR 
266 (hereafter referred to as the Betcorp-case). 
293  Betcorp-case 290.  
294  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 561.  
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same jurisdiction as the parent company (or other controlling entity) in order to 
recognise administrative coordination and consolidation.295  
 
Sarra296 further submits that the effect of the divergence evident in the approaches to 
the COMI concept under Chapter 15 and the EC Regulation "raises significant 
challenges" for future CBI matters involving enterprise groups with entities in both 
the US and the EU. She submits that a solution to this problem would be that all of 
the EU Member States should adopt the Model Law to deal with CBI matters 
concerning non-Member States, as suggested above.297 When faced with a CBI 
matter concerning non-EU countries, the courts in the relevant Member State could 
in turn look at the interpretation and application of the COMI concept under the 
Model Law by jurisdictions that have already adopted the instrument, such as the 
US. As the COMI concept is interpreted and applied differently under the EC 
Regulation and the Model Law, the EU Member States will have two separate "tests" 
for the COMI concept, one test where the EC Regulation is applicable and another 
test where the Model Law is applicable.298 This will ensure that there is uniformity in 
the application of the Model Law internationally and contribute to legal certainty in 
CBI matters worldwide. 
 
With regard to the Sarra's use of a "command and control" test in determining the 
COMI of a debtor, it is submitted that in fact this test does not differ much from that 
used in the EU. Sarra singles out the same objective factors299 which are 
ascertainable by third parties.  Nevertheless, it is submitted that these factors will 
presumably point to the correct jurisdiction qualifying as the COMI. Additionally, the 
"command and control" test will prevent "tax havens" from qualifying as the COMI of 
a debtor. With regard to the substantive consolidation it seems that courts in the EU 
have also been willing to apply this approach (indirectly)300 and it is submitted that it 
                                            
295  See the discussion in para 2.2.7.3 above.  
296  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 561. 
297  See para 2.2.8 above.  
298  The presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of incorporation will carry more weight with intra-
community CBI matters than with CBI matters concerning non-Member States.   
299  See the discussion in para 2.1.2 above. 
300  See, for example, the matters of In the Matter of Daisytek-ISA Limited English High Court (Leeds 
Registry), 16 May 2003 BCC 562 and Cirio del Monte NV Civil Court of Rome, Bankruptcy 
Section, 13 Aug 2003. Also see the discussion in para 2.1.8 above.  
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should be adopted as long as implementation thereof would be to the advantage of 
the creditors as a whole.  
 
2.3.4 Suggested approaches to determine COMI under Chapter 15 
 
2.3.4.1 A dual COMI under Chapter 15 
 
Westbrook301 submits that in most countries the standard for locating a corporation 
on a basis other than its place of incorporation will probably be the identification of 
either that corporation's headquarters302 or the place of its operations,303 which he 
collectively refers to as the "dual COMI". Often the two standards will indicate the 
same jurisdiction, especially when one is dealing with a small or medium sized 
corporation. There will, however, be instances where the two standards indicate 
different jurisdictions. 304  With regard to the policy consideration of predictability, the 
dual COMI will still most likely have a workable result in such a situation, as creditors 
will probably have predicted that either of the two jurisdictions would be the "home of 
the corporation's default". The dual COMI concept will most likely also satisfy the 
policy consideration of acceptability of the substantive law, as it will be quite unusual 
that a "tax haven" would qualify as either the headquarters or the place of operations 
of a debtor.305 Regarding the question of whether the headquarters or the place of 
operations should be applied in instances where the two standards point to different 
jurisdictions, both Westbrook and Chan Ho generally prefer the headquarters, but 
not exclusively so.306 
 
                                            
301  Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1036-1037. 
302  Also referred to as the "real seat" or "chief executive office" of a corporation.  
303  Also referred to as the place where the "principal assets" of a corporation are to be found. See 
Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1035. 
304  For example, in the matter of In re Maxwell Communications Corp 170 BR 800 (Bankr SDNY 
1994) the debtor's headquarters were located in England, but its assets were located at the 
offices of its American subsidiaries. This is hereafter referred to as the Maxwell-case.  
305  For example, in the Maxwell-case the substantive law of either the US or England would be 
within the range of acceptable commercial regulations.  
306  The advantages of holding that the headquarters of a corporation is its COMI are that the 
headquarters is fairly predictable and it permits the centralisation of a corporate group in one 
court. On the downside, the headquarters can be manipulated more easily than the place of 
operations. See Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1039; Chan Ho 2007 JIBLR 639. 
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2.3.4.2 The "most substantial relationship" test 
 
Luna307 suggests that the "most substantial relationship" test should be used to 
determine where the COMI of a debtor-company is situated. This test is universally 
applied to determine the applicable law where there is a conflict of law situation.308 
The test is designed to indicate the law of the country that has "the most significant 
relationship to the transaction and the parties". Various connecting factors are taken 
into consideration by courts when determining the country with the greatest interest 
in the dispute.309 In the bankruptcy context, the location of the debtor's assets, the 
location of the creditors and the place where the transactions between the parties 
occurred would be taken into consideration in order to determine where the COMI of 
a debtor is located.  According to Luna310 this approach will prevent potential forum 
shopping by debtors in the sense that a debtor-company will be unable to change its 
COMI by simply moving its assets to another jurisdiction.  
 
It is submitted that the connecting factors suggested by Luna might not cumulatively 
point to the same jurisdiction, which would defeat the purpose of ascertaining the 
COMI. The location of the debtor's assets might be scattered and might be moved 
from one jurisdiction to another on the eve of a filing for bankruptcy. If this 
connecting factor were to be supplemented by the "residency rule" proposed by 
Bufford,311 forum shopping might be made more difficult. Like the other two 
connecting factors, namely the location of the creditors and the place where the 
transactions between the parties occurred, a multinational corporation will generally 
have creditors in various jurisdictions leading to transactions being entered into in 
various jurisdictions. Accordingly, it is submitted that the connecting factors 
suggested by Luna do not provide the best solution to determine the COMI of a 
debtor-company. The connecting factors suggested by Sarra312 in terms of the 
"command and control" test seem more appropriate and in fact correspond to 
                                            
307  Luna 2007 Fla J Int'l L 671-696.  
308  This test is commonly used under the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (1980). See 
Luna 2007 Fla J Int'l L 681.  
309  These connecting factors include the place of performance, the characteristics of the 
performance, the location of assets and the location of the parties involved. See Luna 2007 Fla J 
Int'l L 681. 
310  Luna 2007 Fla J Int'l L 681-682.   
311  See the discussion in para 2.2.6 above.  
312  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 558-561. 
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Westbrook and Chan Ho's "headquarters" and "place of operations". These factors 
include the debtor's place of registration, the place of decision-making, where the 
financial control is located, and the location of the debtor's operational and 
administrative functions. These connecting factors are both objective criteria and 
ascertainable by third parties, and accordingly seem more appropriate as 
determinants of the COMI of a debtor- company.  
 
2.3.6 Conclusion 
 
Various approaches to determining the COMI of a debtor-company are suggested in 
terms of Chapter 15. Westbrook313 submits that a dual COMI approach would pose a 
solution. This approach entails that one should first look at the jurisdiction of 
incorporation, as there is the presumption that the jurisdiction of incorporation is the 
COMI of a debtor. Then one should determine whether the headquarters of the 
debtor or the place of operations of the debtor indicates that there is another 
COMI.314 Luna315 suggests that certain connecting factors should be taken into 
consideration in order to determine the jurisdiction with "the most substantial 
relationship" to the debtor in order to ascertain its COMI. Sarra316 suggests other 
connecting factors in order to determine the jurisdiction where the "command and 
control" of the debtor takes place. Bufford317 additionally suggests that a "residency 
rule" should be implemented when determining the COMI of a debtor in order to 
prevent forum shopping.  
 
From the above it is evident that there is still no established test for the determination 
of the COMI of a debtor-company under Chapter 15. Currently there is very little 
case law on the exact point. It does seem to be clear, however, that there is a 
difference in the approach adopted by courts in the EU and those in the US. A major 
factor leading to this conclusion is the fact that there is a clear divergence between 
                                            
313  Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1036-1037. 
314  Regarding the question of whether the headquarters or the place of operations should be 
preferred as the determinant of the COMI in instances where the two standards point to different 
jurisdictions, both Westbrook and Chan Ho generally prefer the headquarters, but not exclusively 
so. See Westbrook 2006-2007 Brook J Int'l L 1039; Chan Ho 2007 JIBLR 639. 
315  Luna 2007 Fla J Int'l L 681-682. 
316  Sarra 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 555-561. 
317  Bufford 2005 Am Bankr L J 139. 
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the EC Regulation and Chapter 15 as to the weight to be placed upon the 
presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of incorporation qualifying as the COMI of a 
debtor.318 Whilst it seems that this presumption is heavily relied upon under the EC 
Regulation, academics are ad idem that the same presumption under Chapter 15 
should not carry as much weight, especially in instances where a "tax haven" could 
possibly qualify as the COMI of a debtor.  
 
3  Foreign non-main proceedings: "establishment" 
 
The local existence of an "establishment" is the requirement under the EC 
Regulation, the Model Law and Chapter 15 for a debtor to have non-main or 
secondary insolvency proceedings in a jurisdiction. Virgós and Garcimartín319 submit 
that the concept of an "establishment" is an autonomous concept in the sense that 
its definition should be ascertained independently from any national law.  Unlike the 
situation with a COMI, where neither the EC Regulation nor Chapter 15 provides a 
explicit definition, all three CBI instruments contain a similar definition of an 
"establishment" and have similar requirements for an "establishment" to exist. A 
single discussion on "establishment" is accordingly sufficient.  
 
3.1   Statutory provisions 
 
Article 3(2) of the EC Regulations states as follows:  
 
Where the centre of a debtor's main interest is situated within the territory of a 
Member State, the courts of another Member State shall have jurisdiction to open 
insolvency proceedings against that debtor only if he possesses320 an establishment 
within the territory of that Member State.321  
 
Article 17(2)(b) of the Model Law states:  
 
                                            
318  See para 2.3 above.  
319  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 159.  
320  The word "possession" is not used in a legal or technical sense. It does not matter whether the 
facilities (that constitute an "establishment") are owned, rented or otherwise at the deposal of the 
debtor. All that matters is that the "establishment" must be subject to a certain degree of control 
and direction by the debtor. See Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 162.  
321  Own emphasis added. See para 3.2 below for the definition of an "establishment" contained in a 
2(h) of the EC Regulation. 
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The foreign proceeding shall be recognised as a foreign non-main proceeding if the 
debtor has an establishment within the meaning of subparagraph (f) of article 2 in 
the foreign State.322 
 
Section 1517(b)(2) of Chapter 15 states that 
 
[f]oreign proceedings shall be recognised as a foreign non-main proceeding if the 
debtor has an establishment within the meaning of section 1502 in the foreign 
country where the proceeding is pending.323 
 
3.2  Definition of "establishment" 
 
An "establishment" is the minimum requirement for recognition of foreign insolvency 
proceedings in a jurisdiction.324 The determination of foreign non-main proceedings 
is a definitional matter, not a discretionary matter.325 When determining if a debtor 
has an "establishment", a broad objective test is to be used.326 Whether or not there 
exists an "establishment" is a question of fact and the test used to determine if an 
"establishment" exists is a "reality test".327 Although the definition of an 
"establishment" is almost identical in the EC Regulation, the Model Law and Chapter 
15,328 there are slight differences, which I set out below.  
 
i) Under the EC Regulation, an "establishment" is "any place of operations 
where the debtor carries out non-transitory economic activity with human 
means and goods".329  
ii) Under the Model Law an "establishment" is "any place of operations where 
the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human means 
and goods or services".330  
                                            
322  Own emphasis added. See para 3.2 below for the definition of an "establishment" contained in a 
2(f) of the Model Law.  
323  Own emphasis added. See para 3.2 below for the definition of am "establishment" contained in s 
1502(2) of Chapter 15. 
324  Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 665-689. 
325  Chan Ho 2007 JIBLR 641. 
326  Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 676; Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 
161; and Interedil Srl (In Liquidation) v Fallimento Interedil Srl (C-396/09) [2012] Bus LR 1583. 
327  Fictions that may exist under national laws are therefore not applicable. For example although in 
some jurisdictions a person will be treated as continuing the business of an entity until its debts 
are settled, this is not sufficient for the existence of an "establishment". See Virgós and 
Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 161.  
328  Also referred to as the three instruments.  
329  Article 2(h) of the EC Regulation. 
330  Article 2(f) of the Model Law. 
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iii) Under Chapter 15 an "establishment" is "any place of operations where the 
debtor carries out non-transitory economic activity".331 
 
As seen from above, the EC Regulation contains the term "with human means332 and 
goods", while the Model Law additionally adds "… or services" after this term. In 
order to avoid unintended results in terms of US terminology, this qualification is 
completely left out of Chapter 15. Accordingly, the US has the broadest definition of 
"establishment" with the specific purpose of encompassing as many trade activities, 
economic activities and entities as possible.333 
 
3.3 The general requirements for having an "establishment" 
 
The mere presence of assets of the debtor in a specific jurisdiction will not constitute 
the existence of an "establishment" in that jurisdiction under any of the three 
instruments.334 Additionally, the fact that a debtor has no assets in a specific 
jurisdiction will not automatically mean that there is no "establishment" there.335 With 
reference to the definition of an "establishment", there are four main requirements 
which are contained in all three instruments that have to be satisfied in order to 
constitute an "establishment". 336 
 
i) The debtor must have an economic activity 
 
The economic activities could be professional,337 commercial338 or industrial,339 and 
they need not relate to the assets of the debtor.340 As stated above, the EC 
                                            
331  Section 1502(2) of Chapter 15. 
332  The term "with human means" entails that a minimum level of organization is needed. See 
Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 676. 
333  Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 675. If the term "with human means" were to be included in the 
definition, the term might be interpreted incorrectly, for example by not including enterprises that 
operate in a strictly electronic environment. 
334  Chan Ho 2007 JIBLR 636. The reason for this is to restrict creditors from availing themselves of 
the personal and tactical advantages that may be gained through non-main (secondary) 
proceedings. See Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 52.   
335  Whether or not a debtor has assets in a specific jurisdiction will be a consideration, but it should 
not be seen to be a determining factor with regard to the existence of an "establishment" in that 
jurisdiction. See Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 684.  
336  Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 677. 
337  Examples of professional activities that are sufficient to establish economic activity include 
medical care, accounting work and legal work. See Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 677. 
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Regulation furthermore requires "human means and goods" whilst the Model Law 
requires "human means and goods or services" in addition to the four requirements 
stipulated. It can be argued, however, that these requirements are redundant as it 
would seem that they are covered by an "economic activity" which could be of 
professional, commercial or industrial nature and would accordingly encompass 
human means,341 goods,342 and services.343  
 
ii) The economic activity must be non-transitory in nature344 
 
"Non-transitory" requires that the economic activity must be permanent in nature; a 
mere occasional conducting of an operation will usually not satisfy the requirement to 
prove the existence of an "establishment". A certain degree of stability is required.345 
Stability entails an element of continuation and there will be no "establishment" if the 
debtor had no intention that its transactions should form the basis of a sustained and 
systematic economic operation in that jurisdiction. A court will therefore not rule that 
an "establishment" exists in circumstances where a debtor has carried out one (or 
possibly even several) business transactions within the jurisdiction of a state where 
there is no stable location from which the transactions were conducted.346 An 
                                                                                                                                       
338  Examples of commercial activities include trade transactions for the supply or exchange of goods 
or services, distribution agreements and consulting. See a 1(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (1985).  
339  It is submitted that examples of industrial activities include construction work and engineering.  
340  Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 677-678; para 71 of the Virgós-Schmit Report.  
341  Professional, commercial and industrial activities would require human intervention and 
participation in order for them to occur. For example, a lawyer or doctor is required for 
professional activities; a commercial business will need a manager, staff and employees, and 
industrial activities will need contractors to plan and execute the industrial operation and 
labourers to perform the work.  
342  Commercial activities might involve dealing in goods, like importing fruit or vehicles. Industrial 
activities might involve the production of goods, like constructing a bridge or erecting mining 
equipment.  
343  Professional activities involve rendering services, as when a lawyer provides his client with legal 
advice or a dentist provides his client with dental care. Commercial activities could also entail the 
rendering of services. For example, a transport company renders a service to its clients by 
transporting certain goods. Industrial activities might also entail services being rendered, as in 
the engineering sector.  
344  There is no indication that the term "non-transitory" is interpreted differently in the EU and the 
US, and it is accordingly presumed that the term is interpreted uniformly in these jurisdictions.  
345  See Interedil Srl (In Liquidation) v Fallimento Interedil Srl (C-396/09) [2012] Bus LR 1583. In this 
matter, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that the presence of immovable assets of 
a debtor alone in a jurisdiction or the mere fact that a debtor company has a bank account in a 
jurisdiction does not, in principle, meet the definition of an "establishment".  
346  See para 71 of the Virgós-Schmit Report and Fletcher Insolvency in Private International Law 
376.  
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objective test is used to determine if an economic activity is seen as non-transitory. 
The Virgós-Schmit Report347 provides that the decisive factor is how the economic 
activity appears externally, not the subjective intention of the debtor. The question is 
if it would appear to a third party that the conduct of the debtor was actually 
occurring in a non-transitory manner. There is no minimum duration of time during 
which the debtor had to be conducting such non-transitory activity. The debtor will 
meet this requirement of an "establishment" if there is an "objective showing of 
sufficient permanence"348 which can be observed by third parties. In BenQ Mobile 
Holding BV349 a Dutch debtor-company had a branch office in Germany. The 
German court held that the debtor-company possessed an "establishment" in 
Germany and was accordingly prepared to open secondary insolvency proceedings 
there. The factors that the court took into consideration when coming to this decision 
included that (i) the managing director spent most of his time residing in Germany 
where he negotiated deals between the debtor-company and foreign banks from the 
German branch office; (ii) the employees of the debtor-company worked at the 
German branch office under the supervision of the managing director; and (iii) these 
activities were ascertainable by third parties. The court accordingly found that the 
branch office had been used for non-transitory economic activities.350  
 
iii) The non-transitory economic activity must be at a place of operations351 
 
Virgós and Schmit352 submit that the place of operations means "the place353 from 
where economic activities are exercised on the market". The presence of an office, 
employees and directors in a specific jurisdiction may indicate the existence of a 
place of operations,354 but it is not decisive. It appears that the effect which the 
                                            
347  Para 71 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 281. 
348  Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 678. 
349  BenQ Mobile Holdings BV 1503 IE 4371/06, Local Court of Munich, 5 Feb 2007. 
350  See Marshall (ed) European Cross Border Insolvency 2-186 (para 2.083/3).  
351  There is no indication that the term "place of operations" is interpreted differently in the EU and 
the US and it is accordingly presumed that the term is interpreted uniformly in these jurisdictions. 
352  Para 71 of Virgós-Schmit Report 281.  
353  "Place" refers to the physical location from which the debtor carries out its economic activities. 
See Wessels International Insolvency Law 286. 
354  Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 679. 
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economic activities have is decisive in this regard. According to Virgós and Schmit355 
it is required that the economic activity of the debtor has an external effect on the 
immediate market where the operations take place.356 It will not be sufficient if the 
debtor fulfils only a passive role with regard to an economic activity.357 In BenQ 
Mobile Holding BV358 it was held by a German court that for a debtor to have an 
"establishment" where its branch office was located, the debtor needs to possess a 
business at the branch office which is ascertainable to third parties.359  Mere "internal 
business activities" would not be sufficient.360 Wofford361 further submits that it would 
also not be sufficient if the economic activity affected only the market of another 
jurisdiction.362 
 
The SPhinX-case concerned the provisional liquidation of a debtor corporation in the 
Cayman Islands. As already explained, the debtor, SPhinX Funds, was a hedge 
funds corporation which was established in the Cayman Islands as a "limited liability 
corporation". The provisional liquidators of the corporation applied for recognition of 
these foreign proceedings in New York as main proceedings under Chapter 15. The 
debtor had minimum ties with the Cayman Islands363 and the court therefore found 
                                            
355  Para 71 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 281; Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 679. For example a 
company specialising in the distribution of fresh food produce to supermarkets has an immediate 
effect on the market where operations take place.  
356  Also see Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 160-161. 
357  This will be insufficient due to the lack of an influence on the external market. See Wofford 2008-
2009 Tex Int'l L J 679. See the discussion of the Bear Stearns-case below. Virgós and 
Garcimartín also provide certain instances that will not constitute an "establishment", such as (i) 
the mere presence of the debtor's assets in a jurisdiction; (ii) the presence in a jurisdiction of 
permanent elements which lack a certain degree of organisation (eg a postal address); (iii) the 
presence of permanent elements in a jurisdiction that are linked to a business activity, but do not 
have an external presence in the market of the relevant jurisdiction (eg a storage facility or a 
computer server used for storing data bases). See Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency 
Regulation 161.  
358  BenQ Mobile Holdings BV 1503 IE 4371/06, Local Court of Munich, 5 Feb 2007. 
359  It seems that the court took Recital 13 of the EC Regulation into account, which is actually 
applicable to determining the COMI of a debtor. It is not pertinently stated anywhere in the EC 
Regulation that an "establishment" must be ascertainable to third parties. See Marshall (ed) 
European Cross Border Insolvency 1-41 (para 1.008).  
360  See Marshall (ed) European Cross Border Insolvency 1-41 (para 1.008). 
361  Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 680. It is unlikely that the debtor will have any creditors in a 
jurisdiction where his economic activities have no effect on a specific jurisdiction.  
362  Virgós and Garcimartín agree. They state that from an external point of view an "establishment" 
must involve a distinct presence by the debtor in the market of the jurisdiction in question. See 
Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 160.   
363  No trade or business was conducted there, no employees of the debtor were to be found there 
and it had no physical office in the Cayman Islands. Except for corporate books and records, the 
debtor had no assets in the Cayman Islands and its business was actually conducted from New 
York in the US. 
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that the debtor's COMI was situated outside the Cayman Islands. The court 
accordingly refused to recognise the foreign insolvency proceedings as foreign main 
proceedings. Without discussing the requirements for an "establishment" the court 
found the foreign proceedings to be non-main proceedings and held that364  
 
[w]hen so many objective factors point to the Cayman Islands not being the debtor's 
COMI, and no negative consequences would appear to result from recognising the 
Cayman Islands proceedings as non-main proceedings, that is the better choice. 
 
The SPhinX decision has, however, been convincingly criticised by academics.365 
Glosband366 submits that "the objective facts did not show any 'establishment' in the 
Cayman Islands". Consequently, the debtor had no COMI or "establishment" in the 
Cayman Islands and was therefore "simply not eligible for recognition under Chapter 
15". Westbrook367 submits that transparency and predictability under Chapter 15 
have considerable importance, and noted that the requirement of these qualities is 
essentially nullified by decisions such as the SPhinX-case.   
 
The facts in the Bear Stearns-case368 were similar to those in the SPhinX-case. The 
provisional liquidators of two debtor companies applied to the Southern District of 
New York for recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings in the Cayman Islands as 
foreign main proceedings, or foreign non-main proceedings in the alternative. The 
debtors were registered in the Cayman Islands as "exempted liability companies" 
whose business consisted of investing in various types of securities. The investment 
manager and administrator of the debtors were found in the US, however. In 
addition, the principal interests, assets and management of these debtors were 
located in the US. After having found that the foreign proceedings in the Cayman 
Islands were not main proceedings,369 the court went on to consider if the 
proceedings could be recognised as foreign non-main proceedings. Due to the fact 
that these companies were registered in the Cayman Islands as "exempted liability 
                                            
364  SphinX-case para 122. 
365  See for example Glosband 2007 Am Bankr Inst J 3; Westbrook 2006-2007 Brookl J Int'l L 1024-
1028; Chan Ho 2007 JIBLR 636-641; Hammer and McClintock Law & Bus Rev Am 272-275. 
366  Glosband 2007 Am Bankr Inst J 3. 
367  Westbrook 2006-2007 Brookl J Int'l L 1026.  
368  In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Ltd 374 BR 122 (Bankr 
SDNY 2007). 
368  Bear Stearns-case para 121[14], [15]. 
369  See para 2.2.6 above.  
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companies", they were prevented by statute from engaging in any local business in 
the Cayman Islands, except in order to further business otherwise carried on outside 
the Cayman Islands. The court found that in order for a debtor to have an 
"establishment" it must conduct non-transitory economic activities within the 
jurisdiction of the foreign insolvency proceedings.370 This meant that the debtor had 
to have had a local place of business in the jurisdiction of the foreign proceedings. It 
was found that the debtors did not conduct non-transitory economic activity in the 
Cayman Islands, because the debtors did not conduct any local activity there. 
Accordingly the court held that the debtor companies did not have an 
"establishment" in the Cayman Islands and therefore the foreign proceedings could 
not be recognised as foreign non-main proceedings either.371 
 
iv) The non-transitory economic activity must be carried out by the debtor372 
 
The presence and activities of a debtor's employees are to be considered as 
activities being carried out by the debtor.373 Although there remains some 
uncertainty, it seems that this requirement will be satisfied where a corporate agent 
carries out activities on behalf of the debtor.374 It will be deemed that these activities 
are carried out by the debtor. It is generally accepted that, if an affiliate or subsidiary 
of a parent company has a separate legal personality from the parent company, it 
will not be considered to be an "establishment" of the parent company.375 In Telia AB 
v Hilcourt Docklands Ltd376 the debtor was a Swedish company which had a 
subsidiary in the UK. The petitioners requested the English High Court to recognise 
the UK subsidiary as an "establishment" of the parent company in Sweden in order 
                                            
370  Bear Stearns-case para 131.  
371  See para 3.9 below for the consequences of non-recognition under Chapter 15 and the EC 
Regulation. 
372  There is no indication that the term "carried out by the debtor" is interpreted differently in the EU 
and the US and it is accordingly presumed that the term is interpreted uniformly in these 
jurisdictions. 
373  Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 681. The employees carrying out the work of the debtor need not 
even be employed by the debtor itself. In the BenQ Mobile Holdings-case it was held that the 
"human means" requirement would be satisfied if the employees of another group company were 
spending time working for the debtor in question. See Marshall (ed) European Cross Border 
Insolvency 1-42 (para 1.008). 
374  Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 681-682. Also see the Bear Stearns-case and In re Amerindo 
Internet Growth Fund Ltd No 07-10327 (Bankr SDNY Feb 9, 2007). 
375  Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 682-684; Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency 
Regulation 162.   
376  Telia AB v Hillcourt Docklands Ltd [2002] EWCH 2377 (Ch). 
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for them to be able to initiate proceedings in the UK. The court refused the request 
and held that the mere presence of a business premises of the debtor in the UK was 
insufficient to constitute an "establishment" for the purposes of article 3(2) of the EC 
Regulation.377  
 
There are, however, arguments in favour of allowing a subsidiary or affiliate to be 
considered an "establishment" of its parent company. Firstly, the definition of an 
"establishment" does not deal with the relationship such an "establishment" should 
have to the debtor. In the second place, the creditors of the subsidiary might have 
the legitimate expectation that the subsidiary bears the same economic resources as 
its parent company. In the third place, multinational insolvency proceedings might be 
defeated if there were to be separate legal proceedings for each separate legal 
entity.378 Virgós and Garcimartín submit that there are certain special circumstances 
in which a subsidiary may be deemed to constitute an "establishment" of its parent. 
An example would be where the subsidiary behaves in the market as a branch of its 
parent by performing economic activities that are very like those of its parent. In such 
an instance, the subsidiary will appear to be an operational extension of its parent 
company in the market.379 Based on the above, it seems that a rule can be 
formulated: generally a subsidiary will not be regarded as an "establishment" of its 
parent company, unless there are exceptional circumstances (for example where the 
subsidiary acts as an operational extension of its parent). 
 
It should be noted that the discussion above deals only with the general 
requirements for the existence of an "establishment" as defined in all three of the 
models. As Chapter 15 has no further requirements, all that need be complied with in 
order to constitute an "establishment" are the four general requirements. The EC 
Regulation additionally requires that the economic activity should be carried out "with 
human means and goods"; whilst the Model Law requires that the economic activity 
should be carried out "with human means and goods or services". Virgós and 
Garcimartín380 state that the reference to "human means and goods" in the EC 
Regulation suggests that some form of organisational presence is required in the 
                                            
377  Telia AB v Hillcourt Docklands Ltd [2002] EWCH 2377 (Ch) para 856-857. 
378  See Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 683.  
379  See Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 162.  
380  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 161.  
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relevant jurisdiction, such as a branch office, a workshop or a factory. According to 
Wessels381 "human means" refers to "employees or other people who have the 
power to create legal relationships between a creditor and a debtor, for example an 
employee or an agent". There are two types of "goods", namely goods which 
facilitate the economic activity (such as office furniture, cars and advertising 
materials) and goods which are the result of the economic process (such as the raw 
materials, the semi-manufactured materials and the end products).382 As stated 
above, it can however be argued that these additional requirements under the EC 
Regulation and Model Law are unnecessary, as it would seem that they are already 
included in an "economic activity", which can be of a professional, commercial or 
industrial nature and accordingly encompasses human means, goods and services. 
 
3.4  Scope of the non-main proceedings 
 
The position under the EC Regulation, the Model Law and Chapter 15 is that non-
main proceedings are always "territorial" in nature and therefore limited to the assets 
located in that jurisdiction.383 It is immaterial whether or not those assets are linked 
to the economic activities of the "establishment".384 The law applicable to the 
secondary insolvency proceedings under the EC Regulation is the local law of the 
jurisdiction opening the non-main proceedings.385 Upon opening non-main 
proceedings, the local liquidator of those territorial proceedings has exclusive powers 
                                            
381  Wessels International Insolvency Law 287. 
382  Wessels International Insolvency Law 287. Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs submit that the reference 
to "goods" should actually read as a reference to "assets", as goods are limited to tangible 
movables, whilst assets include movable and immovable property. Accordingly, the ownership of 
or an interest in land will be sufficient to constitute an "establishment". See Moss, Fletcher and 
Isaacs EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 243-245. It should be noted that in none of the 
sources found on this topic and referred to in the text is there an explanation as to the exact 
meaning of "services" in this context.  
383  See a 3(2) of the EC Regulation and para 24 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 271. The EC 
Regulation contains uniform rules of location in order to resolve any uncertainties presented by 
the territorial location of assets (see a 2(g) of the EC Regulation). The relevant time for 
determining the location of the debtor's assets is the time that the insolvency proceedings are 
opened. If assets are therefore removed from a jurisdiction after non-main insolvency 
proceedings have been opened, the liquidator may act outside his territory to recover such 
assets (see a 18(2) of the EC Regulation). See Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency 
Regulation 163.  
384  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 163.  
385  Para 27 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 271. Also see aa 4(1) and 28 of the EC Regulation. Non-
main proceedings accordingly offer an exception to the universal effect that is accorded to main 
insolvency proceedings. See Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs EC Regulation on Insolvency 
Proceedings 50.  
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over the debtor's assets to be found in that territory and the direct powers of the 
liquidator in the main insolvency proceedings no longer applies to those assets.386 
Local proceedings are, however, not exclusively reserved for local creditors, and all 
of the creditors of the debtor to be found worldwide may participate in local 
proceedings.387 This approach is in accordance with the principle of the equal 
treatment of creditors.388 It should further be noted that whilst there may be only one 
set of main insolvency proceedings (situated where the debtor has its COMI), there 
is no limit on the number of secondary proceedings that may be opened.389  
 
3.5  Function of non-main proceedings 
 
According to Virgós and Schmit,390 non-main proceedings have two main functions. 
Firstly, such proceedings "protect local interests" in the sense that local creditors 
may apply for the opening of local insolvency proceedings in order to protect 
themselves from the effect of foreign laws. Where main insolvency proceedings are 
conducted in another jurisdiction, the local creditors can ensure that their legal 
position will be the same in local proceedings. Secondly, non-main proceedings 
serve as "auxiliary proceedings" to the main insolvency proceedings. The liquidator 
in the main insolvency proceedings may also request the opening of secondary 
proceedings if it is required for the efficient administration of the debtor's estate.391   
 
                                            
386  De Boer and Wessels "Dominance of Main Proceedings" 190.  
387  Article 32 of the EC Regulation and s 1513(a) of Chapter 15. Participation in the local insolvency 
proceedings takes place directly through the liquidator of the main proceedings. See para 27 of 
the Virgós-Schmit Report 271. 
388  Para 27 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 271. 
389  If the debtor has a number of "establishments" in various jurisdictions, secondary insolvency 
proceedings may be opened in each of those jurisdictions. See Wessels International Insolvency 
Law 284.  
390  Para 32-33 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 271-272. 
391  Irrespective of whether non-main proceedings are referred to as non-main proceedings, auxiliary 
proceedings or secondary proceedings, all of these terms refer to the same type of proceedings 
with the function of protecting local creditors and serving the main proceedings. The purpose of 
the non-main proceedings is therefore to facilitate the administration of the insolvency 
proceedings and the realisation of the debtor's assets. This might be required in instances where 
the estate of the debtor is too complex to administer as a single unit or where there are major 
differences in the legal systems of the jurisdictions concerned. See Virgós and Garcimartín 
European Insolvency Regulation 156 and para 32-33 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 271-272. 
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3.6  The reference date for determining if an "establishment" exists 
 
There seem to be differing views among US and European academics as to what the 
reference date for the existence of an "establishment" should be. Wofford392 submits 
that the requirements for an "establishment" must be present within the state in 
question393 at the time when the foreign proceedings are opened,394 not necessarily 
when the petition for the recognition of the proceedings is filed. The legal question 
before the court in Müller Gerüstbau GmbH395 was if the Dutch court opening 
secondary insolvency proceedings possessed international jurisdiction to do so 
where the German debtor-company had ceased to have an "establishment"  in the 
Netherlands more than eight months before opening such proceedings. Taking the 
wording of article 3(2) of the EC Regulation into account, the District Court of 
Dordrecht found that the question as to the existence of an "establishment" must be 
assessed by the court at the time of the court's decision to open or not to open 
secondary insolvency proceedings. If, at that time, the debtor does not possess an 
"establishment" in the court's jurisdiction, no secondary proceedings may be opened. 
Accordingly, the judgment opening secondary proceedings was set aside.396  
 
On the other hand, in Lavie v Ran (in re Ran)397 the US Supreme Court of Appeal 
held that the relevant time to determine whether or not a debtor possesses an 
"establishment" in a specific jurisdiction is the time that the petition for recognition of 
the foreign proceedings was filed.398  
                                            
392  Wofford 2008-2009 Tex Int'l L J 685.  
393  Fletcher Insolvency in Private International Law 377.  
394  It will not be sufficient if an "establishment" existed at some time in the past only.  
395  Müller Gerüstbau GmbH District Court of Dordrecht, LJN; AQ6547; NIPR 2004/372, 11 Aug 
2004. 
396  In the matters of Trillium (Nelson) Properties Ltd v Office Metro Ltd [2012] ILPr 30 and Interedil 
Srl (In Liquidation) v Fallimento Interedil Srl (C-396/09) [2012] Bus LR 1583 it was held that the 
relevant date for determining the existence of an establishment is the date of the presentation of 
the petition for recognition of the insolvency proceedings.  
397  Lavie v Ran (In re Ran) 607 F3d 1017 (5th Cir 2010). 
398  Lavie v Ran (In re Ran) 607 F3d 1017 (5th Cir 2010) para [12]. One reason given by the court for 
this decision is the fact that s 1502 of Chapter 15 is written in the present tense, which implies 
that a court should consider whether a debtor has an "establishment" in a certain jurisdiction 
when the application for recognition of the foreign insolvency proceedings is filed. Also see para 
2.2.5 above for a discussion of the facts of the matter. However, in the matter of In re Millennium 
Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Ltd 458 BR 63 (Bankr SDNY 2011) it was held that the 
appropriate date at which to determine the COMI of a debtor is not the date on which the petition 
for recognition is filed, but on or about the date of the commencement of the foreign proceeding 
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Wessels,399 Virgós and Garcimartín400 submit that the moment at which the 
application for insolvency proceedings is filed is decisive in this regard. This is the 
only reference date which is aimed at the prevention of forum shopping, which is one 
of the aims of the EC Regulation.401 Accordingly, any changes that occur after this 
date will have no effect on the jurisdiction of a court to open non-main insolvency 
proceedings.402 It is submitted that this position is correct as it will lead to legal 
certainty worldwide and prevent forum shopping. Additionally, this reference date 
also seems to be the most appropriate reference date for determining COMI under 
both the EC Regulation and Chapter 15.403 
 
3.7   Local proceedings under the EC Regulation 
 
Under the EC Regulation, non-main proceedings (or local proceedings as they are 
termed)404 may be instituted either before main proceedings have been instituted or 
thereafter. "Local proceedings" are divided into "independent proceedings" and 
"secondary proceedings".405 If non-main proceedings are instituted before main 
proceedings,406 those proceedings are termed "independent proceedings".407 Such 
proceedings may be winding-up or reorganization proceedings.408 There are only two 
instances where a court of a Member State may open "independent proceedings", 
namely:  
                                                                                                                                       
for which recognition is sought. The court held further that the same date should be used to 
determine whether or not a debtor has an "establishment". See para 76 of the judgment. 
399  Wessels International Insolvency Law 285. 
400  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 159.   
401  See Recital 4 of the EC Regulation.  
402  If the "establishment" of a debtor in state A is therefore relocated to state B after the date that an 
application to open non-main insolvency proceedings is filed, courts in state A will retain their 
jurisdiction to open non-main proceedings (although the basis for such jurisdiction does not exist 
any more). This position is in accordance with the principle of perpetuation fori. See Virgós and 
Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 159.  
403  Accordingly, the question of whether or not a debtor possesses an "establishment" in a specific 
jurisdiction will be determined at the same point in time as the determination of the COMI. See 
Marshall (ed) European Cross Border Insolvency 2-171.  
404  Called "local insolvency proceedings" by Virgós and Schmit, due to their territorial nature. See 
the Virgós-Schmit Report 271. 
405  Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 170-171. It should be noted that 
Chapter 15 does not make any reference to such independent territorial proceedings and refers 
only to non-main proceedings.  
406  This will be the instance where insolvency proceedings are instituted in a jurisdiction where the 
debtor possesses an "establishment", although main insolvency proceedings have not been 
instituted in the jurisdiction where the debtor's COMI is located.   
407  There are no main proceedings to which the "independent proceedings" are subordinate.  
408  Para 31 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 271. 
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i) where the insolvency laws of the state where the COMI is located do not permit 
main insolvency proceeding to be opened there;409 or 
ii) where a local creditor or a creditor of a local "establishment" requests the 
opening of territorial proceedings.410 
 
Fletcher411 submits that these limited instances where creditors can request the 
opening of independent territorial proceedings are aimed at preventing disruptive 
and possible pre-emptive tactics by creditors who do not have a close personal 
nexus to the jurisdiction where the "establishment" of a debtor is located.412 In a 
matter before the Commercial Court of Tongeren413 the debtor-company was 
incorporated in the Netherlands and possessed an "establishment" in Belgium. The 
Belgian tax authority applied for the opening of non-main proceedings in Belgium. 
The court opened independent territorial proceedings in Belgium, as no main 
proceedings had been opened in the Netherlands where the debtor's COMI was 
located.            
 
Once main insolvency proceedings have been opened the independent proceedings 
become secondary proceedings.414 Secondary proceedings may normally only be 
winding-up proceedings,415 but if preceding independent proceedings were 
reorganisation proceedings, subsequent secondary proceedings may continue to be 
                                            
409  An example of such a case would be if the debtor is a public company which is not permitted to 
be declared insolvent under the insolvency law of the state where the COMI is to be found.  
410  Article 3(4) of the EC Regulation. Also see Recital 17. The opening of independent territorial 
proceedings under a 3(4) of the EC Regulation can be requested only by a creditor "who has his 
domicile, habitual residence or registered office in the Member State within the territory of which 
the establishment is situated, or whose claim arises from the operation of that establishment".  
411  Fletcher Insolvencies in Private International Law 375.  
412  Recital 17 of the EC Regulation states that independent territorial proceedings are "intended to 
be limited to what is absolutely necessary".  
413  Case nr AR A/03/1126, Commercial Court Tongeren, 31 May 2003. See Wessels International 
Insolvency Law 289.  
414  Para 25 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 271. The secondary proceedings are legally linked to the 
main proceedings. There must be coordination between the secondary proceedings and the 
main proceedings, which entails a certain degree of subordination of the former to the latter. See 
Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 157. 
415  See a 27 of the EC Regulation. The reason is that proceedings that are aimed at restructuring a 
debtor-company require global decisions which affect all of the assets of the debtor. Accordingly, 
a complete restructuring of a debtor-company can take place only in a jurisdiction where the 
decisions made have a global scope (not mere territorial scope, as is the instance with 
secondary proceedings). See Virgós and Garcimartín European Insolvency Regulation 175.  
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reorganisational in nature, unless the liquidator in the main proceedings requests 
otherwise.416 
 
3.9  Consequences of non-recognition 
 
3.9.1  Position under the EC Regulation 
 
In instances where the debtor possesses neither a COMI nor an "establishment" in a 
Member State, courts in that Member State will not have the international jurisdiction 
to open main or secondary insolvency proceedings in that specific Member State 
under the EC Regulations.417 An example of such a situation would be where a 
debtor has its COMI in state A and assets in state B, although it does not have an 
"establishment" (or its COMI) in state B. The courts of state B will not be able to 
open main or secondary insolvency proceedings against the debtor under the EC 
Regulation. The assets located in state B will belong to the estate of the main 
insolvency proceedings in state A.418 Presumably419 the creditors located in state B 
will have to prove their claims and take part in the foreign insolvency proceedings, 
when foreign insolvency proceedings have been instituted.  
 
3.9.2  Position under Chapter 15 
 
In the Bear Stearns-case it was held that in instances where the debtor does not 
possess a COMI or an "establishment" in a jurisdiction, the foreign proceedings "are 
not eligible for relief as main or non-main proceedings under Chapter 15". 
Nevertheless, the non-recognition of foreign proceedings under Chapter 15 does not 
leave petitioners without the ability to obtain relief from the US courts. In order to 
ensure that a foreign representative is not left without any remedy upon non-
recognition of the foreign proceedings, section 303(b)(4) of the US Bankruptcy Code 
                                            
416  Para 31 of the Virgós-Schmit Report 271. 
417 Wessels International Insolvency Law 286.  
418  See a 4(2)(b) of the EC Regulation.  
419  There are no indications of the consequences to be found in the sources found on this topic and 
referred to in this text.  
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provides that a foreign representative may commence proceedings under Chapter 7 
or 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. Section 1509(f) of Chapter 15 states that420  
 
[t]he failure of a foreign representative to commence a case or to obtain recognition 
under this chapter does not affect any right the foreign representative may have to 
sue in a court in the United States to collect or recover a claim which is the property 
of the debtor.  
 
It is submitted that this approach should be adopted in all CBI matters in which the 
Model Law is applicable, in order to create legal certainty throughout the world.  
 
4  Choice-of-law 
 
In a CBI matter, the court must perform a choice-of-law analysis in order to 
determine the validity of a creditor's claim as well as the distribution priority of that 
claim. Westbrook421 submits that there are two separate legal issues that have to be 
addressed in this regard. Firstly, the existence and amount of a claim will be 
governed by the "non-bankruptcy law". When making this determination, a court 
should consider the normal choice-of law factors, such as the place where a contract 
was concluded422 and the parties' choice of law.423 Secondly, the distribution priority 
of the claim is governed by the "bankruptcy law". When making this determination, a 
court should consider the debtor's affairs as a whole on a worldwide basis and 
determine the debtor's COMI.424 In CBI matters where a territorial approach is 
adopted, however, the court that determines the existence and amount of the claim 
will also choose its own bankruptcy law to determine the distribution priority of a 
claim.425 Where the "modified universalism" approach is adopted, however, the 
"bankruptcy law" and "non-bankruptcy law" will often be different legal systems. A 
practical example would be where the debtor has its COMI in state A and it has a 
creditor in state B where they concluded a contract. The law of state B (the non-
bankruptcy law) will determine the validity and amount of the creditor's claim, whilst 
                                            
420  Additionally, the operation of ss 1525, 1526, 1527 and 1529 of Chapter 15 does not depend upon 
the existence of foreign main or non-main proceedings. See Chan Ho 2007 JIBLR 640.  
421  Westbrook 2005 Penn St Int'l L Rev 626. 
422  See Forsyth Private International Law 6-8; 190-206 for a discussion on connecting factors.  
423  See Forsyth Private International Law 294-295; 304-307 for a discussion on choice-of-law and 
party autonomy.  
424  Westbrook 2005 Penn St Int'l L Rev 632.  
425  Westbrook 2005 Penn St Int'l L Rev 626.  
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the bankruptcy law of state A would determine the distribution priority of the creditor's 
claim.   
 
In Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products NV v Stonington Partners Inc426 the US 
courts failed to apply this choice-of-law analysis correctly. The debtor-company 
(Lernout) was incorporated and managed in Belgium, but had acquired and merged 
with two US companies less than two years before its bankruptcy. When bankruptcy 
proceedings were instituted, its largest group of assets was located in the US. The 
claimants (Stonington), who consisted mainly of persons located in the US, alleged 
that Lernout had defrauded them when they accepted Lernout's stock in exchange 
for the companies that they had owned. They subsequently claimed damages from 
Lernout. There was a conflict between the bankruptcy law of the US and the 
bankruptcy law of Belgium as to the distribution priority of the Stonington creditor 
claims. In terms of the US bankruptcy law the Stonington creditor claims would fall 
subordinate to the unsecured creditor claims, resulting in the creditors receiving 
nothing in the bankruptcy proceedings. If Belgian law were to be applied, the 
creditors would be treated the same as the other unsecured creditors with non-
priority claims.427 This entailed that they would receive a pro rata distribution after the 
priority claims had been paid out. Accordingly, if US bankruptcy law applied the 
creditors would receive nothing, but if the Belgian bankruptcy law applied they would 
be entitled to a dividend. The choice-of-law ruling made by the court was that the US 
bankruptcy law governed the distribution priority of the creditor's claims.428 
Accordingly, the US law governed both the existence and amount of the creditor's 
                                            
426  The first decision by the bankruptcy court was unreported. The decision of the court a quo was 
re-affirmed on appeal by the District Court. See Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products NV v 
Stonington Partners Inc 268 BR 395 (D Del 2001).  
427  This was due to the fact that Belgian Law prohibits discrimination among creditors of the sort 
allowed under US Law. 
428  The decision of the court was affirmed by the District Court on appeal (see Lernout & Hauspie 
Speech Products NV v Stonington Partners Inc 268 BR 395 (D Del 2001). The claimants 
appealed to the Court of Appeal (see Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products NV v Stonington 
Partners Inc 310 F3d 118 (3d Cir 2002)), which held that the choice-of-law by the court a quo 
was fundamentally flawed and had to be reconsidered and accordingly remanded the case to the 
court a quo. Before the court a quo the debtor presented a Chapter 11 liquidating plan, which 
was approved by the court after there were negotiations with the Belgian trustees and 
subsequent amendment. The court, however, still relied upon its initial choice-of-law 
determination that the US bankruptcy law was applicable to the distribution priority of the claims. 
See In re Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products NV 301 BR 651 (Bankr D Del 2003). This decision 
was once again re-affirmed by the District Court. See In re Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products 
NV 308 BR 672 (D Del 2004).  
J WEIDEMAN AND AL STANDER                                            PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
206 / 638 
 
claims as well as the distribution priority of those claims. The problem with this 
decision is that it follows the territorialist approach, whilst the US follows the modified 
universalist approach to CBI matters.429  In this regard Westbrook states that:430 
 
On that basis, a court committed to a form of universalism would be wrong to 
approve a plan such as the one approved in Lernout. Not only was it a territorialist 
plan, but it denied the stock-fraud claimants the benefit of the Belgian distribution 
rules to which, on the above analysis, they were entitled and would reasonably 
have expected to see applied in the bankruptcy of a Belgian company. 
 
Westbrook points out that the choice-of-law analysis by the US courts was 
"fundamentally flawed" as the courts confused the choice of bankruptcy law with the 
choice of substantive law governing the claims themselves. The courts made the 
"basic mistake" of relying on the US contracts and interests of the creditors in order 
to determine the bankruptcy law.431 The US courts should instead have applied the 
US law to determine the validity and amount of the creditor claims and then 
independently  have determined what bankruptcy law should have been applied to 
determine the proper distribution priorities.432 
 
5  Conclusion  
 
5.1 Legal principles applicable to the determination of the COMI and 
"establishment" of a multinational enterprise 
 
Under the EC Regulation, Chapter 15 and the Model Law main proceedings are 
instituted in the jurisdiction where the debtor has its COMI. The EC Regulation states 
that the court within which the COMI of the debtor is situated will have the jurisdiction 
to open main insolvency proceedings, which are universal in scope. The COMI of a 
debtor should correspond to the place – the directing centre - where that debtor 
                                            
429  Westbrook 2005 Penn St Int'l L Rev 629.  
430  Westbrook 2005 Penn St Int'l L Rev 635. 
431  Westbrook 2006 Tex Int'l L J 335. 
432  Taking the circumstances of the matter into account, the COMI of the debtor would according to 
Westbrook probably have been in Belgium, and consequently the bankruptcy law of Belgium 
should have prescribed the distribution priority of the creditors' claims. See Westbrook 2005 
Penn St Int'l L Rev 632; Westbrook 2006 Tex Int'l L J 335. It is submitted that this view is open to 
critique. It is the writers' opinion that the debtor's COMI was situated in the US. 
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conducts the administration of his interests – the so-called head office functions - on 
a regular basis and is therefore objectively ascertainable to third parties.  
 
A debtor's COMI is not fixed and can accordingly be changed. The legal definition of 
a COMI, however, requires a new location to be genuine, in the sense that it should 
be the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his main interests on a 
regular basis.  
 
In determining if the EC Regulation is applicable in respect of a debtor-company, the 
only test is whether or not that debtor's COMI is to be found within the relevant 
Member State, irrespective of where it is incorporated. The EC Regulation will 
accordingly be applicable in instances where a debtor-company has its COMI within 
the EU but is registered outside the EU.433 
 
Under the EC Regulation, the Model Law and Chapter 15, a debtor must possess an 
"establishment" in a jurisdiction in order for non-main proceedings to be instituted in 
that jurisdiction. Non-main proceedings are territorial in nature. An objective test is 
used to determine if a debtor possesses an "establishment" in a jurisdiction. Under 
all three instruments, there are four general requirements that have to be complied 
with in order for an "establishment" to exist, namely (i) the debtor must have an 
economic activity in the relevant jurisdiction; (ii) the economic activity must be non-
transitory in nature; (iii) the non-transitory economic activity must be at a place of 
operations; and (iv) the non-transitory economic activity must be carried out by the 
debtor. Although it is not pertinently stated anywhere in the EC Regulation that an 
"establishment" must be ascertainable to third parties, this element is definitely 
relevant. The EC Regulation furthermore requires "human means and goods" whilst 
the Model Law requires "human means and goods or services" in addition to the four 
requirements. This qualification is completely left out of Chapter 15. It can, however, 
be argued that these requirements are unnecessary as it would seem that they are 
included in any "economic activity", which can be of professional, commercial or 
                                            
433  See the matter of BRAC-Rent-A-Car International Inc [2003] 2 All ER 201. For a discussion of 
the matter, see para 2.1.7 above.  
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industrial nature and accordingly encompasses human means, goods and 
services.434  
 
In instances where the debtor possesses neither a COMI nor an "establishment" in a 
Member State of the EU, the courts in that Member State will not have the 
international jurisdiction to open main or secondary insolvency proceedings in that 
specific Member State under the EC Regulations. The position in the US is that in 
instances where the debtor does not possess a COMI or an "establishment" in a 
jurisdiction, the foreign proceedings are not eligible for relief as main or non-main 
proceedings under Chapter 15. However, this does not leave petitioners without the 
ability to obtain relief from the US courts, as the foreign representative may 
commence proceedings under Chapter 7 or 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. 
 
In a CBI matter, the court must perform a choice-of-law analysis in order to 
determine the validity of a creditor's claim as well as the distribution priority of that 
claim. These are two separate legal issues. Firstly, the existence and amount of a 
claim will be governed by the "non-bankruptcy law". When making this 
determination, a court should consider the normal choice-of-law factors, such as the 
place where a contract was concluded and the parties' choice-of-law. Secondly, the 
distribution priority of the claim is governed by the "bankruptcy law". When making 
this determination, a court should consider the debtor's affairs as a whole on a 
worldwide basis and determine the debtor's COMI. 435   
 
5.2  The reference date for determining the COMI and "establishment" 
 
The ECJ has held that the reference date for determining the COMI under the EC 
Regulation is the moment that an application to open insolvency proceedings is 
filed.436 This position is accordingly binding throughout the EU. The US Court of 
Appeals has held that the reference date for determining the COMI under Chapter 15 
is the time that the petition for recognition of the insolvency proceedings is filed.437 
There seems to be a divergence in opinion as to the reference date for determining if 
                                            
434  For a discussion, see para 3.3 above.   
435  For a discussion, see para 4 above.  
436  For a discussion, see para 2.1.3 above.  
437  For a discussion, see para 2.2.5 above.  
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an "establishment" exists. The US Court of Appeals438 held that the relevant time to 
determine if a debtor possesses an "establishment" in a specific jurisdiction is the 
time that the petition for recognition of the foreign proceedings was filed.  The only 
problem with this is that non-main proceedings may be instituted before main 
proceedings. Although main insolvency proceedings have not been instituted in the 
jurisdiction where the debtor's COMI is located, non-main insolvency proceedings 
may be instituted in a jurisdiction where the debtor possesses an "establishment". 
 
5.3  The presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of incorporation  
 
Both the EC Regulation and Chapter 15 contain a presumption to the effect that the 
registered office of a debtor-company is presumed to be its COMI, in the absence of 
evidence (or proof) to the contrary.439 The EC Regulation refers to "proof to the 
contrary" whilst Ch 15 refers to "evidence to the contrary", but there seems to be no 
real difference between the two instruments as to the meaning of the term. There 
seems to be a clear divergence between the EC Regulation and Chapter 15 as to 
the weight to be placed upon the presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of 
incorporation qualifying as the COMI of a debtor.440 Whilst it seems that this 
presumption is heavily relied upon under the EC Regulation,441 academics are ad 
idem that the same presumption under Chapter 15 should not carry as much weight, 
especially in instances where a "tax haven" could possibly qualify as the COMI of a 
debtor.442 
 
Courts in the US held, correctly it is submitted, that the mere fact that there is no 
objection by creditors and other interested persons to a jurisdiction's qualifying as the 
COMI (or place where the debtor has an establishment) cannot be taken to indicate 
that the jurisdiction is the COMI (or place where the debtor has an establishment), 
especially where the jurisdiction in question is a "tax haven" with very few objectively 
relevant connecting factors pointing to it's being the COMI. The COMI of a debtor (or 
place where the debtor has an establishment) must be ascertained by making use of 
                                            
438  For a discussion, see para 3.6 above.  
439  For a discussion, see para 2.2.6 above.   
440  See para 2.3 above.  
441  See the discussion of the Eurofood-case in para 2.1.8 above.   
442  See the discussion of the Sphinx-case, the In re Bear Stearns-case and the In re Tri-Continental 
Exchange-case in para 2.2.6 above.  
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objective criteria, is ascertainable by third parties, and the recognition requirements 
set out in Chapter 15 are objective. 
 
Not everyone is pleased with the presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of 
incorporation, as it could facilitate forum shopping. A debtor-company can easily 
change its official residency for the purpose of filing bankruptcy proceedings in a 
more favourable jurisdiction. Bufford proposes a solution to this problem that will 
make forum shopping more difficult, namely establishing a "residency rule".443   
 
5.4  The problem with corporate groups 
 
A problem not currently addressed by the EC Regulation, Chapter 15 or the Model 
Law is the insolvency of members of a business enterprise group. It seems that the 
determining factor will be the degree of economic integration within the corporate 
group. Neither LoPucki, Bufford or Adams and Fincke provide for a method of 
determining the degree of economic integration between companies belonging to the 
same group. Bufford, Adams and Finke do state, however, that specialised 
bankruptcy courts might be necessary. It is thus evident that the determination of the 
COMI of a corporate group will require a more sophisticated judiciary as well as a 
more complex economic analysis. Judges will accordingly need appropriate training 
due to the complexity of the matters. When making a determination as to the 
economic integration of a company, there will have to be an enquiry into the 
functional realities of its corporate administration as well as its corporate and 
financial structure. In instances where the members function independently from one 
another, they each of them should be administered and liquidated separately from 
one another and the COMI of each one of the members should be determined 
separately. Procedural coordination will then be allowed. When one is dealing with a 
highly integrated business enterprise, on the other hand, the answer is not that 
simple. It seems that, should it be to the advantage of creditors, the business 
enterprise group should be administered and liquidated as a whole (by disregarding 
the separate legal personality of each member) and determining the COMI of the 
                                            
443  For a discussion see para 2.2.6 above.  
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enterprise group as a whole. This is known as substantive consolidation.444 The 
rights and priorities of a creditor holding a security interest over an asset of an 
enterprise group member should, however, as far as possible be respected in 
substantive consolidation.  
 
5.5  The divergence between the EC Regulation and Chapter 15 with regard 
to the COMI concept 
 
Currently there is still no established test for the determination of the COMI of a 
debtor-company under Chapter 15. Up to now there has been very little case law on 
the exact point. It does seem clear, however, that there is a difference in the 
approach adopted by courts in the EU and those in the US. A major factor leading to 
this conclusion is the fact that there is a clear divergence between the EC Regulation 
and Chapter 15 as to the weight to be placed upon the presumption in favour of the 
jurisdiction of incorporation qualifying as the COMI of a debtor, as discussed above.  
 
It should be kept in mind that whilst the EC Regulation has only regional application, 
Chapter 15 has international application. The EC Regulation was specifically drafted 
to suit the needs and circumstances of the EU Member States and applies only in 
the "controlled environment" of the EU. The presumption contained in section 
1516(c) of the Model Law was taken from the EC Regulation, but the Model Law 
does not function in the same environment and circumstances as the EC 
Regulation.445 Accordingly, it follows logically that there will be a divergence in 
approach as the US has to deal with the problem of "tax havens" and possibly 
inadequate substantive law, which is not the case in the EU.  Predictability can well 
be given more weight in the EU on the assumption that the insolvency laws of each 
EU Member State are reasonably transparent and comply with reasonable 
commercial expectations.  Further, under the EC Regulation, the COMI concept 
determines which jurisdiction will be able to open main insolvency proceedings. 
Under Chapter 15, however, the COMI concept merely determines the nature of the 
foreign insolvency proceedings and does not determine the jurisdiction that opens 
the insolvency proceedings at all. 
                                            
444  See para 2.2.7.3 above.  
445  It applies internationally in an "uncontrolled environment".  
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Diverging approaches to the COMI concept under Chapter 15 and the EC Regulation 
may raises significant challenges for future CBI matters involving enterprise groups 
with entities in both the US and the EU.  A solution to this problem would be that all 
of the EU Member States should adopt the Model Law to deal with CBI matters 
concerning non-Member States. When faced with a CBI matter concerning non-EU 
countries, the courts in the relevant Member State could in turn look at the 
interpretation and application of the COMI concept under the Model Law by 
jurisdictions that have already adopted the instrument, such as the US. As the COMI 
concept is interpreted and applied differently under the EC Regulation and the Model 
Law, the EU Member States would have two separate "tests" for the COMI concept, 
one test where the EC Regulation is applicable and another test where the Model 
Law is applicable. The presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of incorporation 
would carry more weight with intra-community CBI matters than with CBI matters 
concerning non-Member States. This approach would facilitate the aims of the Model 
Law by providing a legal framework which seeks to enhance legal certainty, 
cooperation, coordination and harmonisation between states in CBI matters 
throughout the world. 
 
5.6 Suggestions for South Africa 
 
(a)      COMI 
 
Relating to the tests for determining the COMI, it is submitted that the "command and 
control" test is acceptable for determining the COMI of multinational enterprises. The 
requirements of this test do not significantly differ from those of the test that was 
applied in the Eurofood-case. The only difference is the degree of predictability that 
is required. Furthermore, the "command and control" test is similar to Westbrook's 
test for determining the "headquarters" or "place of business" of a multinational 
enterprise. All of the tests discussed above have two similarities, namely (i) they 
consider the same objective factors and (ii) ascertainability by third parties is 
paramount. These two factors play a primary role in determining the COMI of a 
debtor, which will always be a question of fact. 
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The identification of a COMI involves a combination of three fundamental ideas: (1) 
the first is that "administrative connection" (which is the place of management and 
control of the debtor) takes precedence over both the operational connection (which 
is the place of the debtor's business or operation) and the asset connection (which is 
the place where the assets of the debtor are located). With regard to subsidiary 
companies, the "administrative connection" will be the place where the head office 
(the main centre of administration) of each separate subsidiary company is located.  
(2)  The "external sphere" idea requires the element of being "ascertainable by third 
parties", which entails that the relevant factors must be visible to third parties. The 
most important third parties referred to are creditors and potential creditors. The 
external organization refers to the way the debtor manifests itself on a regular basis 
to the outside world. The term "on a regular basis" indicates a quality of presence. It 
also refers to a degree of permanence.  (3)  The unity idea asks which one of the 
places of management is the "directing centre" where the functions of the head office 
are carried out. 
 
Should a debtor change the location of its COMI, it must still comply with the 
requirements set out in the Eurofood-decision of being identifiable objectively and 
being ascertainable by third parties. The court will need to be satisfied that the 
change in the place where the activities (which fall within the concept of the 
"administration of its interests") are carried on  is a change based on substance and 
not an illusion; and that that change has the necessary element of permanence. 
 
It is submitted that the residency rule carries merit, as implementation thereof as an 
additional requirement for determining the COMI of a debtor will certainly aid the 
minimisation of "forum shopping". This requirement is an objective criterion (as 
required by the Eurofood-case) which may support the requirement that the COMI of 
a debtor must be ascertainable by third parties. Creditors and other third parties 
might not immediately take notice of the fact that a debtor has changed location (for 
example, its headquarters) as it might not influence their day-to-day business. It is 
reasonable, however, to assume that after a certain period (a year may be 
appropriate) a change of location would be widely known. Additionally, an individual 
debtor would not be able to side-step the insolvency courts of the jurisdiction where 
he resides merely by emigrating to another country. 
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The reference date for determining the COMI and "establishment" of a debtor 
company should be the moment when the application to open insolvency 
proceedings is filed, or as with Chapter 15, the time that the petition for recognition of 
the foreign proceedings was filed. Such an approach would lead to uniformity in 
determining the site of the COMI and "establishment" of a debtor company around 
the world, which would facilitate the harmonisation of international insolvency laws 
and lead to legal certainty. In addition, this approach would contribute to the 
prevention of forum shopping, as a debtor would not be able to successfully change 
its COMI or "establishment"in search of the more favourable insolvency laws of 
another jurisdiction after the application for the recognition of insolvency proceedings 
had been filed. 
 
(b)     The presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of incorporation:  
 
As is the position under Chapter 15, South Africa would adopt an international 
approach to CBI matters, as CBI proceedings would not take place in a "controlled 
environment" (as is the position with the EC Regulations). It is submitted that the US 
approach relating to the presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of incorporation 
should be followed in South Africa. The element of predictability in the determination 
of the COMI of a debtor would be important, but would have to be applied in a 
balanced and flexible manner. This factor should not be over emphasised, due to the 
fact that the knowledge of the creditors might not always be based on the true facts 
at hand.   
 
It is illuminating to note that the mere fact that a subsidiary's economic choices are or 
can be controlled by the parent company might not be sufficient to rebut the 
presumption in favour of the jurisdiction of incorporation. Furthermore, a court would 
not be compelled to recognise foreign proceedings as foreign main proceedings 
merely because the registered office of the debtor was in one jurisdiction and no 
objections had been filed against holding that the insolvency proceedings instituted 
in that jurisdiction were main proceedings. The criterion that would have to be taken 
into consideration would be the determination of the place where the debtor 
conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis (the nerve centre or 
main centre of administration), which would have to be ascertainable by third parties. 
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Only if it were found that the debtor conducted regular business operations at its 
registered office in a manner commensurate with a "principal place of business" 
would it be possible to found an establishment. 
 
(c)      Establishment 
 
The four general requirements for an establishment of a debtor company to exist 
were discussed above. With reference to the requirement that the economic activity 
must be non-transitory in nature, a certain degree of stability would be required. 
Stability entails an element of continuation and there would be no "establishment" if 
the debtor had had no intention that its transactions should form the basis of a 
sustained and systematic economic operation in that jurisdiction. A court would 
therefore not rule that an "establishment" existed in circumstances where a debtor 
had carried out one (or possibly even several) business transactions within the 
jurisdiction of a state where there was no stable location from which the transactions 
were conducted.   
 
In evaluating the requirements of "non-transitory economic activity" and "place of 
operations" the courts would take various factors into consideration, including 
whether or not:  
 it would appear to a third party that the conduct of the debtor was actually 
occurring in a non-transitory manner;  
 there was an objective showing of sufficient permanence which could be 
observed by third parties;  
 these activities were ascertainable by third parties; and 
 the place of operations at a branch office was ascertainable to third parties.   
 
In line with these factors and with reference to the requirement that "the non-
transitory economic activity must be carried out by the debtor", the rule could be 
formulated that, generally, a subsidiary will not be regarded as an "establishment" of 
its parent company unless exceptional circumstances exist, such as where the 
subsidiary acts as an operational extension of its parent. Again, how the subsidiary 
company appears to the outside world would be important. 
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Where main insolvency proceedings had not been instituted in the jurisdiction where 
the debtor's COMI was located it would nevertheless be possible to institute non-
main insolvency proceedings in a jurisdiction where the debtor possessed an 
"establishment".  
 
The ALI Principles contain helpful guidelines in instances where there are parallel 
proceedings and assets are to be sold.  The domestic administrator of each 
proceeding would seek to sell the assets in cooperation with other administrators in 
order to produce the maximum value for the assets of the debtor as a whole, across 
national borders. The relevant domestic courts would subsequently approve such 
sales. This would entail that the assets would be sold to realise the greatest value for 
all creditors worldwide, despite any lost advantage that the local creditors in a 
specific jurisdiction might have had if a territorial approach had been followed. The 
local creditors would, accordingly, have no say if territorial proceedings would have 
been to their advantage, but universal proceedings would produce the greatest value 
of the sold assets (being more advantageous to the concursus creditorum as a 
whole). This is simply an application of the general principle of "modified 
universalism", that realising assets and sharing the value of the proceeds should 
take place on a worldwide basis rather than on a territorial basis.  
 
As for as it concerns the problem regarding multinational groups of companies,the 
most sensible solution to the corporate group problem would be to administer the 
independently operated corporate group entities separately in each of their 
respective COMIs whilst administering highly integrated groups together in the COMI 
of the corporate group as a whole.  
 
In the latter instance there would have to be an enquiry into the functional realities of 
the group's corporate administration and its corporate and financial structure. In 
determining the main interest of a debtor, a court would consider the scale of the 
interest administered in a specific jurisdiction and the importance of the interest 
administered in that jurisdiction. Thereafter the court would consider the importance 
and scale of the debtor's interests administered in any other jurisdiction that might 
qualify as the COMI of the debtor. This should be of a significant nature. The 
determining factor would, accordingly, be the degree of economic integration within 
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the corporate group. However, there would still be no suggested method for 
determining the degree of economic integration between companies belonging to the 
same group. Specialised bankruptcy courts might be necessary as the "business 
enterprise group COMI" might prove problematic for the rights of creditors in various 
of the corporate group jurisdictions. This might occur in instances where a creditor 
located in a specific jurisdiction dealt with a debtor-company registered in the 
jurisdiction in which it instituted a claim, and would like a remedy in that jurisdiction. 
In addition, the recognition of a "business enterprise group COMI" would create an 
"inappropriate extension of domestic law" of a jurisdiction, which could prejudice the 
creditors located in other jurisdictions where the distribution priority differs. 
 
It is submitted that the process of considering the different elements would be 
important in each matter and that this task should indeed be placed in the hands of 
persons with specialised experience in the area of CBI. Nevertheless, this research 
shows that the "business enterprise group COMI" is one issue that undeniably needs 
further investigation in the EU, the US and in South Africa, due to the complexity of 
the rights of all the stakeholders. 
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